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declarant: 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the 
subject matter of the declarant's statement despite 
an order of the court to do so; 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if 
the . . . refusal . . . is due to the procurement or 
wrongdoing of the proponent of the declarant's 
statement for the purpose of preventing the 
witness from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness: 
(I) Former testimony. Testimony given as a 
witness at another hearing of the same or a 
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in 
compl iance with the law in the course of the same 
or another proceeding, if the party against whom 
the testimony is now offered . . . had an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect 
examination. 
Utah R. Evid. 804. 
6. In concluding that the trial court did not commit 
plain error in admitting victim impact evidence, we do 
not decide whether victim impact evidence is 
admissible under the Utah Constitution. See State v. 
Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 39 n.38 (March 2, 
1994). Furthermore, in light of the fact that we 
recently held for the first time that section 76-3-207 of 
the Code prohibits the introduction of victim impact 
evidence, id. at 32-33, we cannot conclude that the 
trial court committed plain error when it admitted the 
evidence at issue here in a trial held before our recent 
pronouncement. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-
09 (Utah 1993). 
7. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart takes aim 
at the majority's failure to address each of defendant's 
forty-four claims of error. We note that the sheer 
number of errors alleged is no measure of the merits 
of those claims. The majority has dealt with those 
claims of error that are deserving of attention. 
Justice Stewart also asserts that the trial court's 
instruction on the State's burden of proof was 
undeniably in error, citing State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 
1141, 1147-48 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., concurring in 
the result, joined by Zimmerman and Durham, JJ.), 
and State v. Ireland, 113 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 
1989). In his Johnson opinion, decided after this case 
was tried, when faced with an instruction in all 
pertinent respects identical to the instruction at issue 
here, Justice Stewart concluded that although the 
instruction was incorrect, it did "not rise to the level 
of reversible error." 774 P.2d at 1147 (Stewart, J., 
concurring in the result, joined by Zimmerman & 
Durham, JJ.). 
More importantly, however, we note that the 
instant instruction was proper under legal principles in 
place at the time it was given. Two months before 
Menzies went to trial, this court approved a 
reasonable doubt instruction substantively identical to 
the one at issue here in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 
546, 572-73 (Utah 1987). It was not until one year 
after Menzies' trial that we expressed in Johnson and 
Ireland our disapproval of the "weighty affairs" and 
"possible or imaginary" language. Despite Justice 
Stewart's suggestion to the contrary, this change in the 
law is not entitled to retroactive application under our 
holding in State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 1983), 
overruled on other grounds. State v. Hansen, 734 
P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986). In Norton, we recognized 
that "when this Court established a new rule of law on 
an essential element of a crime, a criminal defendant 
whose direct appeal was pending was entitled to the 
benefit of the new rule for the resolution of his 
appeal." Id. at 583. We went on to emphasize, 
however, that the 
automatic rule of retroactivity as to nonfinal 
judgments only applies to significant changes of 
rules that are not expressly declared to be 
prospective in operation. This qualification is 
necessary to prevent automatic retroactivity from 
displacing the traditional rule that a new rule of 
criminal procedure which constitutes "a clear 
break from the past" will sometimes be 
nonretroactive. 
Id. at 584 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982)). In Ireland, we 
did indicate that the change in the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt-instruction law was not to be 
retroactive. Specifically, the Ireland court's 
declaration that trial courts are to discontinue use of 
the "weighty affairs" and "possible or imaginary" 
language was made in the exercise of this court's 
supervisory power over lower courts. 773 P.2d at 
1380. This is a clear indication that we would strike 
down only future verdicts based on the offending 
language. We reemphasized our intention to do so in 
Johnson, 114 P.2d at 1147 (Stewart, J., concurring in 
the result, joined by Zimmerman & Durham, JJ.). 
Because the invocation of our supervisory powers in 
Ireland demonstrates a commitment on the part of this 
court to prospectively prohibit the use of the offending 
language, the Ireland!Johnson rule is not entitled to 
retroactive application under our holding in Norton, 
675 P.2d at 584.. 
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ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Julie Anderson Turner appeals from 
i jury verdict for defendant Amy Nelson on 
Turner's negligence claim. Turner contends that 
ihe trial court abused its discretion by not 
allowing her to call a "rebuttal" witness whom 
she had not listed on her pretrial designation of 
witnesses. She further asserts that the trial court 
erroneously allowed Nelson to add a nonparty, 
Salt Lake City, to the verdict form in order to 
have the jury apportion its fault. We affirm the 
trial court. 
This action arises from an automobile 
accident. On July 6, 1989, Turner was traveling 
west on Third Avenue near the Canyon Road 
intersection in Salt Lake City. At about the same 
time, Nelson was driving north on Canyon 
Road. Turner contends that Nelson failed to 
heed the "Stop Ahead" warning sign and then 
ran the stop sign at the intersection of Canyon 
Road and Third Avenue. Nelson's vehicle hit 
Turner's vehicle on the front left quarter-panel. 
Turner suffered physical injuries as a result. 
Turner served Nelson with a complaint 
alleging negligence on March 27, 1991. Nelson 
answered the complaint and denied any 
negligence. Her answer claimed, among other 
things, that Turner was contributorily negligent 
and that Turner's injuries were caused by the 
negligence of unnamed third parties. Soon 
thereafter, discovery commenced. 
The trial court issued a scheduling order 
setting February 20, 1992, as the discovery 
cutoff date. The order required both parties, by 
February 14th, to exchange designations of the 
witnesses they planned to call at trial. Although 
Nelson complied with that order, Turner filed 
her designation on February 19th, five days late. 
On February 26th, Nelson filed a "Motion for 
Apportionment of Fault of Salt Lake City" and 
an accompanying memorandum. She sought to 
include Salt Lake City on the verdict form for 
apportionment purposes, even though it was not 
a defendant. Over Turner's objection, the trial 
court granted the motion. 
At trial, Turner presented evidence tending to 
show that Nelson had been negligent in failing to 
heed the stop sign. Conversely, Nelson 
contended in opening arguments and throughout 
trial that Salt Lake City was at fault because it 
"had negligently designed" the intersection and 
because it allegedly had allowed the stop sign to 
become obstructed and perhaps bent, making the 
sign difficult to see. The jury returned a verdict 
of no negligence on the part of Nelson, from 
which Turner appeals.1 
Turner's first contention on appeal is that the 
trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 
allow the testimony of her "rebuttal" witness, 
Jim Nakling. Turner acknowledges that Nakling 
was not listed on her pretrial designation of 
witnesses. She asserts, however, that the need 
for Nakling's rebuttal testimony became 
apparent only after trial began, a fact that 
Specifically, Turner contends that she was 
surprised by defense counsel's statements during 
his opening remarks that the sign had been 
partially obstructed and that Salt Lake City, not 
Nelson, was really at fault. On the evening of 
the first day of trial, Turner's counsel made an 
effort to find a witness to testify that the sign 
had not been obstructed. That same evening, 
counsel found Nakling walking near the accident 
site. Nakling had lived near the relevant 
intersection for the past ten years. He 
purportedly was prepared to testify that he had 
walked his dog by the intersection twice a day 
and the stop sign was not obstructed at the time 
of the accident. 
On the morning of the second day of trial. 
Turner moved the court to allow Nakling's 
testimony, and Nelson opposed that motion. The 
court did not rule on the motion at that time. On 
the third day of trial, Turner attempted to call 
Nakling as a rebuttal witness, effectively 
renewing the motion. Turner argued that the 
testimony was properly admissible to rebut 
Nelson's "new" contentions that the sign was 
obstructed and perhaps had been replaced with 
a larger sign since the accident and that Salt 
Lake City was actually at fault. The court 
refused to allow the testimony, stating: 
I am persuaded that the motion to call the 
new witness should be and is denied, and 
my reasoning is as has been stated by 
[Nelson's counsel}, but moreover, it has 
been the essential defense here that the sign 
was obstructed, thereby limiting the 
Defendant's opportunity to timely observe it 
and take appropriate action. That aspect of 
[Guertz's] testimony is not new, and my 
decision to allow Salt Lake City on the 
verdict form for purposes of apportionment 
of the responsibility here does not change 
the essential defense that the sign was 
obstructed. . . . [I]t seems to me that 
[allowing the testimony in at this point in 
the trial 1 puts [Nelson] at an unfair 
disadvantage, not knowing who this 
individual is and [not] having had the 
opportunity to cross-examine or at least 
depose this witness, while as Mr. Guertz 
[Nelson's expert] was available and notified 
in a timely fashion as far as the opposition 
was concerned, that he would be testifying. 
I am therefore persuaded that it would place 
[Nelson] in an unfair posture to grant this 
motion and it's denied. 
Turner then proffered what Nakling would 
testify to and sought a continuance to allow 
Nelson an opportunity to depose Nakling. The 
court denied the request and again refused to 
allow the testimony. 
The issue before us is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to allow 
Nakling's testimony. We will not reverse the 
trial court unless the appellant demonstrates that 
the trial court has clearly abused its discretion 
"" ' *k^»kv affppfpd the aDDellant's substantial 
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Albretsen, 782 P.2d 515, 518-19 (Utah 1989); 
Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 924 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989); accord In re Estate of Gardner, 
505 P.2d 50, 52 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); King 
Pest Control v. Binger, 379 So. 2d 660, 663 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
As a threshold matter, it is well within a trial 
court's authority to order the parties to disclose 
all potential witnesses in advance of trial. See 
Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 
1993); Hardy, 116 P.2d at 924-25. Such 
disclosure serves a number of significant 
purposes. See, e.g., Kott v. City of Phoenix, 763 
P.2d 235, 238 (Ariz. 1988). It gives both parties 
the opportunity to prepare adequately for trial, 
including, among other things, deposing 
witnesses, investigating witnesses' testimony, 
and preparing an effective cross-examination. 
See, e.g., Gardner, 505 P.2d at 52. It also 
encourages the parties to make a serious effort 
to investigate the facts and discover all relevant 
witnesses in a timely manner. Finally, it furthers 
the orderly and efficient administration of justice 
by avoiding trial delays which might otherwise 
be necessary to accommodate the need to 
prepare for a surprise witness. 
Given these significant policies, a trial court 
does not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow 
a party to call a surprise witness absent "good 
cause" for the failure to disclose the witness as 
required by a court order or rule.2 See Arnold, 
846 P.2d at 1310; Hardy, 776 P.2d at 925. 
When the offering party contends that the 
undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut the 
adverse party's evidence, the issue hinges on 
whether the evidence "sought to be rebutted 
could reasonably have been anticipated prior to 
trial." 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §371, at 570 (1991) 
(emphasis added);see, e.g.,Albretsen, 782 P.2d 
at 518;3 King Pest Control, 379 So. 2d at 663. 
Turner offered Nakling's testimony for the 
express purpose of contradicting Nelson's 
evidence that the sign was obstructed and 
perhaps bent. Turner contends that because 
Nakling's testimony was intended to rebut this 
"new, unforeseen" argument, the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to allow the 
testimony. Turner's claim hangs on whether she 
"could reasonably have anticipated" the 
testimony of Nelson and Nelson's witnesses that 
the sign was obstructed. 
In deciding this issue, the trial court had all of 
the evidence before it and was in the best 
position to determine whether Turner could 
reasonably have anticipated the obstructed-sign 
testimony. As noted earlier, the trial court 
indicated that the testimony regarding the 
obstructed stop sign was "not new" and Nelson's 
"essential defense" had always been that the sign 
was obstructed. Although the trial court did not 
specifically say that Turner "could reasonably 
have anticipated" the testimony, the thrust of the 
court's ruling is clear—Nelson's evidence was 
foreseeable. 
As appellant, Turner has the burden of 
showing that the trial court erred in determining 
that the "new testimony" could have been 
anticipated. To meet this burden, she must 
provide this court with a complete record of all 
evidence relevant to the alleged error. Utah R. 
App. P. 11(e)(2).4 In the absence of a complete 
record "we assume that the proceedings at trial 
were regular and proper." Bevan v. J.H. Constr. 
Co., 669 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1983); see Smith 
v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah 1985); 
Stephens v. Schwendiman, 688 P.2d 466, 467 
(Utah 1984); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 
1002 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In the present case, Turner has failed to 
provide this court with the necessary evidence. 
She has not included in the record or with her 
briefs copies of depositions, Nelson's answers to 
interrogatories, or other evidence that could 
support Turner's claim that Nelson's evidence 
was new. This court must therefore assume that 
the trial court was correct in its statement that 
Nelson had asserted all along that the stop sign 
was obstructed and the intersection poorly 
designed and, by implication, that Salt Lake City 
was negligent. 
Moreover, the record seems to support 
Nelson's assertion that Turner knew or should 
have reasonably anticipated that Nelson would 
claim the sign was obstructed.5 In fact, the 
record suggests that if Turner failed to 
appreciate the extent of Nelson's reliance on this 
defense, it was probably because of Turner's 
earlier failure to depose adequately several 
adverse witnesses. 
Nelson presented the evidence of at least three 
witnesses, including herself, that the sign was 
obstructed and the intersection poorly designed. 
Nelson testified at trial that she was unable to 
see the stop sign until just prior to entering the 
intersection because the sign was partially 
obstructed by foliage. Nelson also presented the 
testimony of Mr. Rusk, a witness to the 
accident. Rusk testified that at the time of the 
accident, the stop sign was bent and partially 
obscured by the limbs of a nearby tree. 
Nelson further introduced the expert testimony 
of Mr. Guertz, who before his retirement was a 
"traffic design expert" with the Utah Department 
of Transportation. Guertz testified that the 
intersection was designed poorly for a variety of 
reasons and that the stop sign might have been 
replaced or moved since the accident. 
Nelson's counsel had listed Guertz, Rusk, and 
Nelson on their designation of witnesses and had 
made them available for deposition. Turner 
made no attempt to depose Guertz or, as far as 
we can tell from the record before us, determine 
through written interrogatories the content of his 
testimony. Rusk apparently was deposed by 
Nelson, and Turner was properly notified of that 
deposition. It is unclear, however, whether 
Turner's counsel chose to attend the deposition 
or examine Rusk. Finally, Nelson was deposed 
by Turner and during that deposition reportedly 
indicated that the stop sign had been partially 
obstructed. Once again, because Turner has not 
provided us with a complete record, we have no 
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/ay of verifying this statement.6 
Similarly, Turner's argument on appeal that 
ialt Lake City's inclusion on the special verdict 
orm created the necessity for Nakling's rebuttal 
estimony is unpersuasive. According to Turner, 
Oakling would have testified only that the sign 
vas not obstructed, bent, or replaced since the 
iccident. The trial court indicated that these 
vere not new issues. In other words, regardless 
Df Salt Lake City's presence on the special 
verdict form, the trial court concluded that it 
was foreseeable that Nelson would assert the 
obstructed-sign defense and, thus, rebuttal 
evidence would be necessary.7 
Finally, given the ease with which Turner's 
counsel located Nakling, there is no merit to the 
argument that he was unavailable or 
undiscoverable, as Turner seems to imply. By 
Turner's own admission, Nakling had lived in 
the area for ten years and walked by the 
intersection twice a day. If Turner's counsel 
could locate him in one night, counsel easily 
could have found him in the months before trial. 
In summary, there is nothing in the record 
before us to indicate that the trial court abused 
its discretion in refusing to admit the testimony 
of the unlisted witness. 
We next address whether the trial court 
misinterpreted the Utah Liability Reform Act 
(the "Act") in granting Nelson's motion to add 
a nonparty, Salt Lake City, to the special verdict 
form. As noted earlier, several days before trial 
Nelson filed a "Motion for Apportionment of 
Fault" and a supporting memorandum. The court 
granted Nelson's motion, adding Salt Lake City 
to the special verdict form on the first day of 
trial. 
According to Turner, the statutory scheme and 
the plain language of the Act do not permit the 
apportionment of negligence to nonparties. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-38 to -41. Therefore, 
the argument continues, the Act requires Nelson 
to join the City as a party before it may be 
added to the special verdict form. See id. This 
would be an issue of first impression in Utah, 
but we do not reach it. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Turner has 
properly interpreted the Act, the presence of Salt 
Lake City on the verdict form was harmless in 
this case. The jury determined that Nelson was 
not negligent. For that reason, the jury never 
reached the issue of whether Turner herself or 
Salt Lake City was negligent, and the jury never 
apportioned fault between the parties. Turner 
simply has not provided this court with a cogent 
theory of how Salt Lake City's inclusion on a 
portion of the special verdict form that the jury 
never reached altered the facts, the presentation 
of those facts, or the result in this case. Cf. 
Beitzel v. City ofCoeurd'Alene, 827 P.2d 1160, 
1164-65 (Idaho 1992). 
Turner admits that Nelson was free to argue to 
the jury that Salt Lake City was at fault, 
regardless of whether the City was included on 
the special verdict form. In fact, it is common 
trial practice for a defendant to allege that a 
third person, named or unnamed, party or 
nonparty, is the real culprit. Turner does not 
allege that the Act in any way restricts this 
practice. Both parties presumably would have 
presented the same evidence and made the same 
arguments, even if Salt Lake City had not been 
on the special verdict form. 
Turner's real complaint seems to be that 
Nelson allegedly concealed, until right before 
trial, her obstructed-sign defense. Turner 
apparently believes that this subterfuge is 
highlighted by the late date of the motion to add 
Salt Lake City to the special verdict form. 
Nevertheless, Turner has not alleged or provided 
evidence suggesting that Nelson in any way 
distorted her answers to interrogatories, failed to 
disclose her defense, or otherwise 
misrepresented her position prior to trial. Nelson 
timely listed all witnesses who testified, made 
them available for discovery, and as far as the 
record we have indicates, truthfully responded to 
written interrogatories. It is not unusual or 
inappropriate for a party to file a trial-related 
motion in close proximity to the trial. In short, 
if Turner believes that discovery abuses 
occurred, that is a separate issue which she 
should have raised at trial. 
The jury determined that Nelson was not 
legally negligent. Turner has failed to 
demonstrate how the City's presence on a 
portion of the special verdict form that was not 
completed by the jury prejudiced her case. The 
error, if any, was harmless. We affirm the trial 
court. 
WE CONCUR: 
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Leonard H. Russon, Court of Appeals Judge 
Hall, Justice, did not participate herein; 
Russon, Judge, sat prior to his appointment to 
this court. 
1. The special verdict form instructed the jury as 
follows: 
Please answer the following questions from a 
preponderance of the evidence. If you find the 
evidence preponderates in favor of the issue 
presented, answer "Yes." If you find that the 
evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot 
determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if 
you find that the evidence preponderates against 
the issue presented, answer "No." Also, any 
damages assessed must be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Considering all of the evidence in this case, 
do you find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant, Amy Nelson, was negligent as 
alleged by the Plaintiff? 
The form provided a space for the jury to check 
either "Yes" or "No." The jury marked the "No" box. 
The form also contained several other questions 
relating to, inter alia, proximate cause and the 
negligence of Turner<and Salt Lake City. The form, 
however, required the jury to answer these questions 
only if it found that Nelson had been negligent. 
F DT?PTII?T<s 
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Because it did not so find, the jury never reached 
these issues 
2. The present case is distinguishable from Board of 
Education v Barton, 617 P 2d 347 (Utah 1980) In 
Barton, the defendant alleged that the trial court had 
abused its discretion in allowing the plaintiff to call a 
witness not listed in the pretrial order Id at 349 This 
court held, however, that the pretrial order, by its 
terms, had expressly indicated that it did not require 
the disclosure of rebuttal witnesses, and thus, it was 
not improper to allow the testimony Id 
In contrast, the pretrial order in the present case 
required the parties to list all witnesses, without 
differentiating between case-in-chief and rebuttal 
witnesses Similarly, neither party's designation of 
witnesses distinguished between types of witnesses 
3. For example, in State v Albretsen the court applied 
the "reasonably anticipated" test to the question of 
undisclosed rebuttal testimony in a criminal trial 782 
P2d 515, 516-18 (Utah 1989) In that case, the 
prosecution obtained a handwritten statement from the 
defendant's alibi witness, Ms Davis, several months 
prior to trial Id at 516 Davis indicated in her 
statement that she and the defendant had driven up a 
local canyon into the mountains at the time of the 
crime, she did not, however, give any specific details 
regarding the drive Id Nevertheless, at trial Davis 
testified regarding the precise route she and the 
defendant had allegedly taken during their ride Id at 
518 After her testimony, the prosecution introduced 
the testimony of a state engineer who testified that the 
route Davis claimed to have taken was impassible 
during the time in question Id The defense objected 
to the testimony, relying on a Utah law that requires 
the prosecution, once it has been notified of the 
defense's intent to offer alibi evidence or testimony, 
to inform the defense prior to trial of witnesses the 
State proposes to offer to contradict or impeach the 
defendant's alibi testimony Id , see Utah Code Ann 
§77-14-2(1) The trial court allowed the State's 
testimony, and the defendant was convicted On 
appeal, this court held that the trial court had not 
abused its discretion in allowing the testimony "in 
view of the fact that the State could not have 
reasonably anticipated the discrepancy between 
Davis's handwritten statement and her later testimony 
at trial Albretsen, 782 P 2d at 518 (emphasis added) 
4. "If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary 
to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the 
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such 
finding or conclusion " Utah R App P 11(e)(2) 
(emphasis added) 
5. In argument before the trial court on the motion to 
allow Nakhng's testimony, Nelson's counsel stated 
that (1) Nelson had indicated the sign was obstructed 
in answers to interrogatories, (2) the issue of the 
obstructed sign had been raised over and over in 
Turner's deposition, and (3) Daniel Rusk, an 
eyewitness to the accident, had indicated in his 
deposition that the sign was obstructed Turner's 
counsel did not refute these claims during the 
argument before the trial court and has provided us 
with no evidence to suggest that Nelson's counsel 
incorrectly stated the facts 
6. As noted earlier, in oral arguments before the trial 
court regarding Turner's motion to allow Nakhng's 
testimony, Nelson's counsel asserted that Nelson had, 
in fact, indicated during her deposition that the stop 
sign had been obstructed Turner's counsel did not 
refute this assertion in his oral statement at trial 
7. As both parties correctly recognized during oral 
argument, it is common practice and generally 
appropriate for a defendant to assert that a third 
person is liable, regardless of whether that party is 
included on the verdict form 
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court commit error by submitting 
conflicting and prejudicially confusing jury instructions to the 
jury? The standard of review is a correctness standard. The Carpet 
Barn v. State Dep't of Trans.. 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
2. Did the trial court commit error by permitting 
Dr. Barry Cook to testify as a rebuttal witness? The standard of 
review is an abuse of discretion standard. Soliz v. Ammerman. 395 
P.2d 25 (Utah 1964). 
3. Did the trial court commit error by permitting 
Dr. Cook to testify and by admitting Exhibits 64 and 65 because the 
testimony and evidence constitutes prejudicial surprise? The 
standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard. State in 
Interest of LPS v. Stevens, 797 P.2d 1133 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
4. Did the trial court commit error by finding that 
Dr. Cook was qualified to testify and render opinions in this case? 
The standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard. Schindler 
v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
1. Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Attached as 
Addendum 5.) 
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2. Rule 103(a) and (d), Utah Rules of Evidence, "Rulings 
on evidence." (Attached as Addendum 6.) 
3. Rule 104(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, "Questions of 
admissibility generally." (Attached as Addendum 7.) 
4. Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, "Testimony by 
experts." (Attached as Addendum 8.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Plaintiff/appellee Marjorie Brady ("Mrs. Brady") and her 
husband, Robert Brady, filed suit against Utah Power and Light for 
injuries suffered in an automobile accident, claiming that the 
collision was the fault of a negligent UP&L employee. (R. 1-3.) 
Mrs. Brady later sued Mountain View Hospital, Dr. Randal B. Gibb 
("Dr. Gibb") and Dr. Clisto D. Beaty ("Dr. Beaty"), the 
anesthesiologist who had assisted Dr. Gibb in the surgery, Xittrium 
Laboratories and Baxter Healthcare, the manufacturer and distributor 
of Exidine, an antimicrobial solution. (R. 261-67.) Essentially, 
Mrs. Brady claimed that one or more of the defendants was negligent 
in permitting an allegedly harmful solution to come in contact with 
her eye and cause damage to the cornea. (Id.) 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
The jury trial of this case began on September 22, 1992, in 
Price, Utah. (See Transcript of Jury Trial, hereinafter, "T. . " ) ' 
The trial was presided over by the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Seventh 
District Judge. UP&L admitted liability for the automobile accident. 
(T. 228.) During the course of the trial, UP&L settled with Mr. and 
Mrs. Brady. 
(T. 979-81.) 
At the close of Mrs. Brady's evidence, Judge Bunnell ruled 
that res ipsa loquitur principles had "no place in this lawsuit." 
(T. 1164-65.) Judge Bunnell also granted a directed verdict in favor 
of defendant Dr. Clisto Beaty. (T. 1163-65.) On October 1, 1992, 
the jury rendered its verdict with respect to the remaining 
defendants. (T. 1541-45.) The jury assessed fault in the following 
percentages: 
UP&L 0% 
Mountain View Hospital 10% 
Dr. Randal B. Gibb 3 0% 
Xittrium Laboratories 40% 
Baxter Healthcare Corporation 20% 
(T. 1544.) The jury awarded total damages in the amount of 
$330,503.15. (Id.) 
'Because the district court clerk failed to paginate the trial 
transcript with the rest of the record on appeal, references to the 
trial transcript will be made by the using the letter "T, " as 
opposed to use of the letter "R" when references are made to the 
paginated portion of the record on appeal. 
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C. TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION. 
Following the trial, counsel for Dr. Gibb filed a 
Motion for New Trial and/or Remittitur. (R. 1578-80.) Dr. Gibb 
argued that prejudicial confusion was created by giving 
Instruction No. 20 along with Instruction Nos. 8, 18 and 19. 
(R. 1581-1589.) Dr. Gibb also argued that Dr. Barry Cook was 
permitted to testify improperly in that he was not qualified to 
render medical opinions, he was an improper rebuttal witness, and 
his testimony constituted prejudicial surprise. (R. 1590-95.) 
The trial court denied Dr. Gibb's Motion for New Trial and/or 
Remittitur. (R. 1796-99, 1800-08) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 16, 1988, Mr. and Mrs. Brady were 
injured in a collision with a UP&L truck driven by a UP&L 
employee. (T. 1-2.) 
2. Mrs. Brady suffered extensive injuries to the left 
side of her face, including a deep laceration from her left 
eyelid down through the lip and a fractured cheek bone. (T. 
884.) 
3. Mrs. Brady was taken to the Mountain View Hospital 
Emergency Room in Payson, Utah. (T. 883.) 
4. Because of the extensive nature of Mrs. Brady's 
injuries to her face, Dr. Gibb was called in to treat Mrs. Brady. 
(T. 883-84, 1188.) 
5. Dr. Gibb is a board-certified otolaryngologist 
(ENT -- ears, nose and throat.) 
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6. Dr. Gibb determined that Mrs. Brady required 
emergency surgery. (T. 885.) 
7. Dr. Beaty was the anesthesiologist for Mrs. 
Brady's surgery. (T. 941.) 
8. After administering anesthesia to Mrs. Brady, 
Dr. Beaty placed Lacri-Lube (an ointment used to protect the eye) 
into both of Mrs. Brady's eyes, and taped them shut with a 
silk-type tape. (T. 926-27, 940, 948-50.) 
9. After the Lacri-Lube and tape were in place, 
Dr. Gibb cleaned the left side of Mrs. Brady's face with Exidine 
and saline. (T. 910, 926-27, 953, 1194-98.) 
10. Exidine is an antimicrobial solution with 
chlorhexidine gluconate as its primary active ingredient. 
(T. 553-54.) 
11. Dr. Gibb used Exidine to scrub the inside and 
outside of Mrs. Brady's facial wound. (T. 1194-95.) 
12. Dr. Gibb used only two or three ounces of Exidine. 
(T. 1196.) 
13. Dr. Gibb used approximately one liter of saline to 
irrigate Mrs. Brady's sinuses and to wash away the Exidine. 
(T. 1196-97.) 
14. The Exidine somehow came into contact with Mrs. 
Brady's right eye and caused damage to the cornea despite the 
fact that both eyes were taped shut and packed with Lacri-Lube. 
(T. 1196.) 
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15. Dr. Beaty watched Mrs. Brady's face to prevent 
substances from approaching the right eye and did not observe any 
substance cross the bridge of Mrs. Brady's nose and enter her 
right eye. (T. 954-55.) 
16. Following surgery, Mrs. Brady complained of 
burning and tearing in her right eye. (T. 1063-64, 1201-04.) 
17. In January 1989, Mrs. Brady received treatment for 
her right eye from Dr. Dafler, a Price ophthalmologist. (T. 680, 
1065.) 
18. In March 1989, Dr. Dafler sent Mrs. Brady to be 
examined and treated by Dr. Kevin Charlton at the University of 
Utah Medical Center. (T. 1066.) 
19. Dr. Charlton, a specialist in cornea transplant 
surgery and diseases of the cornea, attributed Mrs. Brady's 
condition to Fuch's Dystrophy, a natural degenerative disease of 
the eye. (T. 681.) 
20. On April 11, 1989, Dr. Charlton performed a cornea 
transplant on Mrs. Brady. (T. 684.) 
21. On April 14, 1989, Dr. Charlton informed 
Dr. Dafler that he did not know the cause of Mrs. Brady's right-
eye vision problem. (T. 702.) 
22. Dr. Charlton expressed interest in knowing whether 
Fuch's Dystrophy was the cause of Mrs. Brady's vision problem. 
(T. 702.) 
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23. On April 26, 1989, Dr. Charlton reported to 
Dr. Dafler that he would "check to see what's in" Exidine. 
(T. 703.) 
24. Dr. Frederick E. Fraunfelder ophthalmologist and a 
national expert in toxic eye injuries, performed extensive 
experiments on Lacri-Lube, the silk-like tape, and Mrs. Brady's 
eye tissue to determine whether Exidine could have caused the 
damage to Mrs. Brady's cornea. (T. 552-58, 621-26.) 
25. On May 10, 19 89, Dr. Charlton informed Dr. Dafler 
that he was satisfied with Dr. Fraunfelder's conclusion that 
Exidine had damaged Mrs. Brady's eye. (T. 703-04.) 
26. On July 26, 1990, Mr. and Mrs. Brady sued UP&L for 
injuries sustained in the collision. (T. 1-3.) 
27. On September 4, 1990, UP&L filed a Third-Party 
Complaint against Mountain View Hospital and Dr. Gibb. (T. 58-
65.) 
28. At trial, Mrs. Brady attempted to establish that 
Exidine was a toxic solution and that it should never have been 
used during the surgery. (Passim.) 
29. Mrs. Brady introduced evidence that established 
her visual acuity in the right eye as 20/30 and that established 
chronic dryness and a lack of tearing in the eye. (T. 1071-72, 
1074-76, 1084-85.) 
30. In 1987, Stuart Pharmaceuticals mailed a "Dear 
Doctor" letter to designated physicians, informing them about 
possible dangers from use of the product, Hibiclens, which, like 
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Exidine, is a brand-name antimicrobial solution containing 
chlorhexidine gluconate. (T. 995-97, 1005-11, 1013-14.) 
31. Several expert witnesses, including ENT physicians 
and ophthalmologists, testified they did not remember receiving 
or did not receive the Hibiclens "Dear Doctor" letter. (T. 706, 
619-20, 1257, 159-60.) 
32. In 1987, an article was published in the Journal 
of Ophthalmology which stated that Hibiclens was toxic to the 
eye. (T. 554-55.) 
33. Dr. G. Marsden Blanch, an otolaryngologist from 
Salt Lake City, Utah, testified that at the time in question, he 
was never made aware of the Journal of Ophthalmology article or 
any other literature addressing the dangers of chlorhexidine 
gluconate. (T. 1259-60.) 
34. At trial, Dr. Fraunfelder rendered opinions about 
labelling defects, the use of Exidine as a pre-operative 
cleanser, and the use of chlorhexidine gluconate around the eye. 
(T. 545-47, 552, 562, 594, 596-97, 602-04, 645.) 
35. As a result of Dr. Fraunfelder's testing and 
experiments for this case, he designed a new eye patch which was 
designed to keep solutions out of the eye during surgery. 
(T. 625-26.) 
36. Mrs. Brady called Dr. Mark S. Granick, an 
otolaryngologist and plastic surgeon from Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, to testify concerning the standard of care for 
Dr. Gibb. (T. 735, 43-44.) 
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37. Dr. Gibb called Dr. G. Marsden Blanch, an 
otolaryngologist from Salt Lake City, Utah, to testify concerning 
Dr. Gibbs' care. (T. 1265.) 
38. Dr. Gibb testified in support of his own care. 
(T. 1207-09.) 
39. Xittrium called Dr. Randal Olsen, who testified by 
way of deposition about the standard of care for otolaryngologist 
in protecting against damage to the eye. (T. 1329.) 
40. Mrs. Brady also offered opinions of Dr. Olsen in 
support of her claims against Dr. Gibb. (T. 1323-24.) 
41. For the first time in the case, Mrs. Brady 
testified at trial that she suffered from a peripheral vision 
problem. (T. 1071, 1086-87, 1368-70.) 
42. During her deposition on July 26, 1992, some two 
months before trial, Mrs. Brady made no mention of any peripheral 
vision problem in her right eye. (Excerpts from Marjorie Brady 
Deposition, pp. 50, 54, 56, 75, 77-78, 94, attached at 
Addendum 4.) 
43. None of the defendants presented any evidence 
which directly controverted Mrs. Brady's claim that she suffered 
from a peripheral vision problem. 
44. During the last afternoon of trial, the trial 
court permitted Dr. Barry Cook to testify as a rebuttal witness 
for Mrs. Brady. (T. 1371-91.) 
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45. The trial court also permitted Mrs. Brady to 
testify a second time concerning the alleged peripheral vision 
problem. (T. 1368-71.) 
46. Dr. Cook is a Price optometrist who saw Mrs. Brady 
for the first time in many years during the lunch hour on the day 
of his testimony. (T. 1388-90.) 
47. Mrs. Brady's visit to Dr. Cook was arranged by her 
local counsel. (Id.) 
48. Over the objection of counsel for Dr. Gibb, Dr. 
Cook was permitted to testify that the vision in Mrs. Brady's 
right eye was 20/60 and that she suffered from a significant 
peripheral vision deficit. (T. 1372-87.) 
49. Mrs. Brady's own treating ophthalmologist had 
earlier testified that, six days before trial, Mrs. Brady's 
visual acuity was 20/30 in both eyes. (T. 693, 700.) 
50. Mrs. Brady's treating ophthalmologist testified 
that Mrs. Brady had good functional vision and made no mention of 
a peripheral vision problem. (Id.) 
51. Dr. Cook had not been identified as a witness by 
counsel for Mrs. Brady, despite interrogatories seeking that 
information and despite a pretrial order requiring the 
designation of witnesses. (T. 1101-03.) 
52. In closing argument, the emphasis of 
Mr. Humpherys' argument on damages was Mrs. Brady's alleged 
peripheral vision problem. (T. 1474-76, 1535-36.) 
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53. At the close of the evidence, the trial court 
dismissed Mrs. Brady's res ipsa loquitur claim. (T. 1164-65.) 
54. Over the objection of counsel for Dr. Gibb, the 
trial court gave Instruction No. 20, the "common knowledge 
exception" instruction. (T. 1414-15, Addendum 2.) 
55. In addition to the "common knowledge exception" 
instruction, the trial court also submitted two separate 
instructions which required the jury to decide the case solely on 
the basis of expert testimony. (T. 1421-22, 1425-26, 
Addendum 3.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error by giving a 
"common knowledge exception" jury instruction. The nature of 
this case is such that lay persons do not possess the common 
knowledge, experience and understanding required to assess 
standards of care and alleged breaches of those standards. It 
was also error for the trial court to give a "common knowledge 
exception" jury instruction, in conjunction with several 
instructions mandating that the jury must rely upon expert 
testimony to evaluate the standard of care for Dr. Gibb. The 
submission of conflicting jury instructions created 
irreconcilable confusion for the jury and resulted in substantial 
prejudice to Dr. Gibb. 
The trial court also erred by permitting Dr. Barry Cook 
to testify as a rebuttal witness at trial. Dr. Cook did not 
rebut any evidence of defendants, but was used only to bolster 
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Mrs. Brady's damages' claim. It was also error to allow Dr. Cook 
to testify because he was not a qualified expert to render 
medical opinions about Mrs. Brady's condition. 
The surprise use of Dr. Cook prejudiced Dr. Gibb by 
denying him an opportunity to evaluate Dr. Cook's credentials, 
examine his methods and assess his true qualifications as an 
expert witness. Even had counsel for Dr. Gibb not objected, it 
was plain error to allow Dr. Cook to testify and to admit into 
evidence Exhibits 64 and 65, the "visual field" test results. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 20, THE 
"COMMON KNOWLEDGE EXCEPTION" INSTRUCTION. 
In submitting the case to the jury, the trial court 
allowed Instruction No. 20 to be given over the objection of 
counsel for Dr. Gibb. (T. 1414.) Instruction No. 20 reads as 
follows: 
Expert testimony is unnecessary to establish 
the standard of care owed to the plaintiff by 
defendant Dr. Randall B. Gibb and Mountain 
View Hospital in a medical malpractice case 
where the medical procedure is of a kind or 
the outcome so offends commonly held notions 
of medical propriety, that the standards of 
care can be established by the common 
knowledge, experience and understanding of a 
layman. 
(T. 1426, Addendum 2.) Judge Bunnell's reason for giving 
Instruction No. 20 is reflected in the Order Re: Post-Trial 
Motions ("the Order"): 
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With respect to the question of conflicting 
jury instructions, the court finds that a 
common knowledge exception to the requirement 
for expert testimony exists. The common 
knowledge exception applied to establishing 
the duty of care in this case. The common 
knowledge exception would also apply and, at 
the same time, expert testimony was required 
to establish whether or not there was a duty 
of care and whether or not there was a breach 
of that duty. 
(R. 1805.) 
Dr. Gibb maintains that Judge Bunnell incorrectly 
believed that the common knowledge, experience and understanding 
of a layman would permit the jurors to be familiar with the 
various standards or duties of care that were alleged to apply to 
Dr. Gibb. 
A. 
THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE EXCEPTION 
DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
Based upon the language of the Order, Judge Bunnell 
apparently found "standard of care" and "duty of care" to be 
synonymous. "Duty of care" is defined as follows: 
The duty of care generally owed by a 
physician to his patient is to exercise that 
degree of skill and learning ordinarily 
possessed and exercised, under similar 
circumstances, by other practitioners in his 
field of practice. He must use ordinary 
(ordinary for a physician) and reasonable 
care and diligence, and his best judgment, in 
applying his skill to his patient's case. 
Farrow v. Health Serv. Corp., 604 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1979). In 
this case, Mrs. Brady alleged that Dr. Gibb owed her essentially 
three different duties of care. Each duty must be examined to 
demonstrate that none of the alleged duties was within the common 
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knowledge, experience and understanding of the layman. See 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). The best 
illustration of the alleged duties of care is found in the 
testimony of Mrs. Brady's primary expert witness. 
Counsel for Mrs. Brady called Dr. Mark S. Granick, an 
otolaryngologist and plastic surgeon from Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, as an expert witness. Mr. Humpherys directed the 
focus of his examination into three alleged standards of care 
that, it was claimed, Dr. Gibb had breached: 
Q. Doctor, I have requested that you 
address the actions of Dr. Gibb in three 
areas. One, did he breach the standard 
of care regarding staying current on the 
use of his primary drugs and 
pharmaceutical solutions? I think 
you've answered that. 
A. Yes. 
Q. The second question I wanted you to 
address is where he used it; that is, on 
the face of Mrs. Brady in that location. 
Was that a breach of his standard of 
care? 
A. Yes. This agent specifically should be 
not used on the face. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because of potential hazards to both the 
eyes and the ears. 
Q. Now, third, I've asked you to address 
the area of how he used it during the 
surgical procedure. Do you have an 
opinion, based upon how he used it, 
whether he breached his standard of care 
as an operating physician? 
(T. 743-744, emphasis added.) According to Dr. Granick, Dr. Gibb 
had the duty to (1) "stay current" on the use of pharmaceutical 
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solutions, (2) avoid the use of Exidine on the face, and 
(3) avoid the use of "copious" amounts of Exidine as a solution 
to wash the face. (T. 743-45.) When all is said and done, 
Mrs. Brady's claim concerning the standard of care for Dr. Gibb 
in this case is simply stated: Dr. Gibb should not have used 
Exidine on Mrs. Brady's face. 
In order for the common knowledge exception to apply, 
it must be shown that the lay person, based upon his or her own 
common knowledge, experience and understanding and without the 
aid of expert testimony, knows that Dr. Gibb should not have used 
chlorhexidine gluconate on Mrs. Brady's face. Dr. Gibb did not 
use hydrochloric acid on Mrs. Brady's face. If he had, the 
common knowledge exception might be appropriate. Since the lay 
person does not even know what chlorhexidine gluconate is, much 
less whether Exidine contains chlorhexidine gluconate and whether 
it is potentially toxic to the eye, the common knowledge 
exception is not applicable and the giving of Instruction No. 20 
constituted reversible error. 
The origin of the common knowledge exception in Utah is 
generally traced to the Supreme Court of Utah decision in 
Fredrickson v. Maw. 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951). In 
Fredrickson. the plaintiff claimed that the defendant physician 
was negligent in leaving gauze and threads in the tonsil cavity 
following a tonsillectomy. In affirming a judgment for the 
plaintiff based upon evidence that did not include expert 
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testimony, the Supreme Court quoted with favor from Wharton v. 
Warner, 135 P. 235 (Wash. 1913): 
The reason is that in most cases a layman can 
have no knowledge whether the proper medicine 
was administered or the proper surgical 
treatment given. Whether a surgical 
operation was unskillfully or skillfully 
performed is a scientific question. If 
however a surgeon should lose the instrument 
with which he operates in the incision in 
which he makes in his patient, it would seem 
as a matter of common sense that scientific 
opinion could throw a little light on the 
subject. 
227 P.2d at 773 (emphasis added). Fredrickson was followed by 
the 1959 decision in Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 
1108 (1959). In Marsh. the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
was negligent in casting his foot following a procedure known as 
a "triple arthrodesis." The Utah Supreme Court rejected the 
plaintiff's argument that the case fell within the common 
knowledge exception. The Court expressly noted that it was 
certainly not within the common knowledge of the layman as to how 
tight a cast should be applied following a triple arthrodesis. 
The Court stated: 
In the absence of a standard of care 
established by expert medical testimony and 
some evidence showing a deviation from the 
standard, it must be presumed that the 
physician skillfully operated on and treated 
the plaintiff. To allow the question of 
negligence to be submitted to the jury 
without first establishing the standard of 
care would allow a jury to indulge in a type 
of speculation not generally allowed. 
To submit the question of liability to the 
jury under such circumstances would be to 
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base a verdict upon a mere possibility of 
negligence. It is seldom that a doctor's 
standard of care, because it is so 
specialized, is known or is within the 
knowledge of a layman. 
347 P.2d at 1111 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court again discussed the 
applicability of the common knowledge exception in Kim v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980). In Kim, a dentist dropped a 
drill bit down the plaintiff's throat during the course of a root 
canal operation. The trial court granted the defendant dentist's 
motion for directed verdict on the basis that the plaintiff had 
failed to establish the appropriate standard of care through 
expert testimony. In reversing the trial court, the Court 
stated: 
When the impropriety of treatment complained 
of is of such a nature that lay person could 
judge from common knowledge and experience 
that such an injury would not happen if there 
had been proper skill and care, expert 
testimony is not necessary. Examples of this 
exception are where medical supplies or 
treatment are left in the patient. The loss 
of the drill bit down the plaintiff's throat 
fits within the pattern of those cases. 
610 P.2d at 1271. 
The decision in Kim was followed by the oft-cited 
decision in Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980). In 
Nixdorf, the defendant physician lost a curved cutting needle 
during the course of performing a hysterectomy. The physician 
made the conscious decision to leave the needle in the operating 
site after unsuccessful attempts to locate and recover the 
needle. A majority of the Supreme Court noted: 
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However, this Court has recognized certain 
exceptions to the general rule requiring 
expert testimony. Specifically, expert 
testimony is unnecessary to establish a 
standard of care owed the plaintiff where the 
propriety of the treatment received is within 
the common knowledge and experience of the 
layman. The loss of a surgical instrument or 
other paraphernalia, in the operating site, 
exemplifies this type of treatment. 
(Id. at 352.)2 
Based upon the evolution of Utah case law from 
Fredrickson through Nixdorf. it is apparent that the common 
knowledge exception is a very narrow exception indeed. It is 
applicable only in the rarest of cases where the standard of care 
for the physician is obvious. This is not such a case. The case 
against Dr. Gibb really turned on what Dr. Gibb knew about 
Exidine and chlorhexidine gluconate and when he should have 
acquired that knowledge. The testimony of Dr. Olsen, offered as 
an expert against Dr. Gibb by both Xittrium and Mrs. Brady, 
illustrates the difficulty that even a highly trained 
ophthalmologist was having with the issue of when the standard of 
care required Dr. Gibb to acquire knowledge about Exidine: 
Interestingly, Justice Stewart dissented and noted that not even a "foreign object in the body" case was 
an obvious candidate for the common knowledge exception: 
I recognize that there is a ring of common sense to the proposition 
that leaving foreign objects in a person constitutes negligence, see 
Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951), but 
neither justice nor common sense are enhanced by the mechanistic 
application of a rule of law to a fact situation that is only 
superficially related to the type of situation the rule was intended to 
govern. In this case, I cannot see how a jury could possibly find 
negligence in light of Dr. Hicken's testimony and in the absence of 
any contrary expert testimony. I think the trial judge was right in 
directing a verdict on this issue. 612 P. 2d at 357. 
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Q. Dr. Olsen, is it your testimony that it 
was Dr. Gibb's responsibility to not use 
the Exidine solution that was presented 
for his use in the surgery of Mrs. Brady 
in December of 1988? 
A. My testimony is that a prudent person at that time 
could have used it about the face but with care 
and attention to make sure that it didn't get into 
the eye and in particular at that time, that it 
was a significant concern and would have been 
disseminated through that period of time. 
Certainly, and as I pointed out, in these legal 
events we unfortunately like to talk about the 
perfect world, and the real world is different. 
There's a dissemination curve. It's a real fact. 
At what point should that have been 
general knowledge? At the time of the 
"Dear Doctor" letter, late 1987, I think 
general information should have been 
available; certainly by late 1988. 
Using it -- I think more and more 
people would not have been using it 
about the head and face, but I think to 
be very careful about the eye. And 
there are ways of prepping in which you 
are very careful about the eye. Copious 
irrigation, liberal use, is a way that 
would be hard to prevent keeping it out 
of the eye. So I feel that using it was 
not necessarily at that point a problem. 
I think today it probably would be. But 
I think that how it was used was 
probably a problem. 
(T. 1352-53, emphasis added.) 
Dr. Gibb used Exidine on Mrs. Brady's face in December 
of 1988. The evidence at trial established that the information 
concerning the potential harmful effects of chlorhexidine 
gluconate appeared only in the ophthalmology literature and not 
in the ENT literature that Dr. Gibb would be expected to read. 
(Testimony of Dr. Fraunfelder, T. 631.) Even Dr. Olsen --
someone who, as an ophthalmologist, would be attuned to and 
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expected to read ophthalmology literature -- had a difficult time 
saying when the standard of care would have required Dr. Gibb to 
know that Exidine was potentially harmful to the eye. If someone 
like Dr. Olsen has such difficulty, it simply cannot be 
reasonably argued that the standard of care is common knowledge. 
Based upon the testimony of Dr. Olsen -- a witness 
whose opinions were offered in evidence by Mrs. Brady herself --
two of the three duties argued by Mrs. Brady's other expert 
witness, Dr. Granick, are eliminated. The remaining standard is 
Dr. Gibb's alleged duty to avoid the use of "copious" amounts of 
Exidine on Mrs. Brady's face. A layman does not possess the 
common knowledge, experience and understanding to determine 
Dr. Gibb's duty in that regard. See, Fredrickson, supra 
("Whether a surgical operation was unskillfully or skillfully 
performed is a scientific question."). The determination of 
whether Dr. Gibb skillfully used Exidine on Mrs. Brady's face 
required expert testimony and was not susceptible of resolution 
with common knowledge. 
One point that should not be overlooked is the 
fundamental notion of the injury itself. This case is unlike the 
other common knowledge cases in which the nature of the injury 
itself is so obvious as to be commonly understood to be a product 
of negligence. In this case, the nature of the injury and how it 
occurred was not known for many months after the December 19 88 
surgery. As late as April of 19 89, Dr. Kevin Charlton, 
Mrs. Brady's treating ophthalmologist, suspected that the injury 
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might have been due to Fuch's Dystrophy. (T. 681.) It was only 
after Dr. Charlton enlisted the help of Dr. Fraunfelder that 
extensive experiments were conducted to determine how the Exidine 
might have entered the "off" eye despite the fact that the eye 
was closed, packed with Lacri-Lube and patched. If the nature of 
the injury was an initial mystery to the physicians involved, it 
can hardly be said that the injury itself suggested obvious 
negligence. 
POINT II 
WHEN GIVEN AFTER INSTRUCTION NO. 18 AND 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19f INSTRUCTION NO. 2 0 CREATED 
PREJUDICIAL CONFUSION IN THE MINDS OF THE JURORS. 
Judge Bunnell gave three instructions which addressed 
the standard of care for Dr. Gibb. The first was Instruction 
No. 18: 
In deciding whether a physician properly 
fulfilled his or her duties, you are not 
permitted to use a standard derived from your 
own experience with physicians nor any other 
standard of your own. A physician is 
required to exercise the same degree of 
learning, care, skill and treatment 
ordinarily possessed and used by other 
qualified physicians in good standing 
practicing in the same medical field. The 
law does not require that a physician 
exercise the highest degree of care. It 
requires the physician to exercise the degree 
of care that other qualified physicians would 
ordinarily exercise under the same 
circumstances. 
(T. 1425-26, Addendum 3.) Instruction No. 19 followed: 
The only way you may properly learn the 
applicable standard of care and determine 
whether or not the defendant physicians 
conformed to it is through evidence presented 
during this trial by individuals testifying 
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as expert witnesses who knew of that standard 
as it existed at that time, and by other 
evidence admitted for the purpose of defining 
the standard of care. 
(Id.) On the heels of those two instructions which both 
admonished the jury that they were not permitted to define the 
standard of care from their own experience, Judge Bunnell gave 
Instruction No. 20: 
Expert testimony is unnecessary to establish 
the standard of care owed to the plaintiff by 
defendant Dr. Randall B. Gibb and Mountain 
View Hospital in a medical malpractice case 
where the medical procedure is of a kind, or 
the outcome so offends commonly held notions 
of medical propriety, that the standards of 
care can be established by the common 
knowledge, experience and understanding of a 
layman. 
(Id.) 
Thus, after twice instructing the jury that expert 
testimony was necessary to establish the standard of care for 
Dr. Gibb, Judge Bunnell created irreconcilable confusion by 
instructing the jury that expert testimony was unnecessary. 
Judge Bunnell attempted to explain his reasoning in his 
Order. (R. 1800-08, Addendum 1.) Judge Bunnell's explanations 
are almost as confusing as the three jury instructions 
themselves. Interestingly, Judge Bunnell fails to refer to 
Instruction No. 19 altogether. (R. 800-06.) Instruction No. 19 
and Instruction No. 20 are in direct conflict with each other. 
Obviously, Instruction No. 20 was given immediately after 
Instruction No. 19. In omitting any reference whatsoever to 
Instruction No. 19, Judge Bunnell demonstrated that he failed to 
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appreciate the confusion that was created by the two inconsistent 
instructions. Judge Bunnell states: 
The common knowledge exception applied to 
establish the duty of care in this case. The 
common knowledge exception would also apply 
and, at the same time, expert testimony was 
required to establish whether or not there 
was a duty of care and whether or not there 
was a breach of that duty. 
(R. 1805, Addendum 1.) These two sentences cannot be reconciled 
with each other any more than Instruction Nos. 18, 19 and 20 can 
be. How can the common knowledge exception apply to 
"establishing the duty of care," while at the same time expert 
testimony was required to establish whether or not that duty of 
care existed? Judge Bunnell goes on to state: 
Instruction No. 18 and Instruction No. 20 
were given in an attempt to answer both the 
rulings of the Utah Supreme Court in this 
area. The Court notes that both Instruction 
No. 18 and Instruction No. 20 are in the 
Proposed Uniform Jury Instructions without 
any explanation except the citations to the 
cases from which they come. Both 
instructions are recognized and it is an 
extremely close call as to whether or not the 
jury would be misled by giving both 
instructions. 
(R. 1805, Addendum 1.) There are many instructions in the Model 
Utah Jury instructions ("MUJI"), many of which are in direct 
conflict with other instructions. It is the responsibility of 
the trial judge to decide which instructions are applicable in 
each particular case. Jury Instructions are not given simply 
because they appear in MUJI. The trial judge must evaluate the 
evidence that has been presented in the case and determine which 
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instructions are proper and which are not. In this case, Judge 
Bunnell improperly left that determination to the jury. 
Judge Bunnell goes on to attempt to justify his error 
by explaining that there was sufficient expert testimony in the 
case with respect to the standard of care for Dr. Gibb. Judge 
Bunnell's explanation misses the point. The jury, faced with the 
irreconcilable confusion created by Instructions Nos. 18, 19, and 
20, could easily ignore all the expert testimony and decide the 
case based upon the common knowledge exception set forth in 
Instruction No. 20. For the reasons stated in Point I A. above, 
the common knowledge exception has no place in this case. While 
there was expert testimony offered against Dr. Gibb, even the 
adverse experts conceded points to Dr. Gibb and, at the very 
least, equivocated in their testimony. Dr. Fraunfelder, 
acknowledged to be the nation's leading expert in his field, 
supported Dr. Gibb's defense in a number of areas. For example, 
Dr. Fraunfelder testified: 
• In the "real world" whether a physician 
should know that Exidine and Hibiclens 
had the same active ingredients would be 
"shades of gray." (T. 603.) 
• In the "real world" in 19 88, physicians 
were using Exidine as a pre-operative 
scrub solution, wound cleaner and skin 
prep. (T. 614, 632.) 
• It would not be fair to require a doctor 
to make the correlation that Exidine and 
Hibiclens were exactly the same product. 
(T. 637-38.) 
• The majority of physicians could not 
tell what the active ingredients and 
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chemicals were in the solutions they 
were using. (T. 638.) 
• The original warning label on Exidine 
was not explicit enough to inform 
doctors of the hazards of allowing 
Exidine to migrate into a patient's eye. 
(T. 639.) 
• Even after reading the ophthalmology article 
explaining the potential risk of chlorhexidine 
gluconate, he would consider using it with extreme 
precaution to keep it out of the eye. (T. 656.) 
• He did not know the difference between a scrub 
solution and a pre-operative surgical scrub 
solution, just as he was sure that Dr. Gibb did 
not know the difference. (T. 667.) 
In addition to establishing these and other concessions on 
cross-examination from adverse experts, Dr. Gibb also offered 
expert testimony of his own in support of his care. The effect 
of allowing the case to go to the jury with Instruction No. 20 
was to permit the jury to avoid the required exercise of deciding 
the case based upon expert testimony. The jury was allowed to 
improperly decide the case without scrutinizing and evaluating 
evidence from the expert witnesses. If the jury had been 
required to weigh the expert testimony and decide the case in 
that manner, it is submitted that the result would have been far 
different. 
In Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp.. 830 P.2d 270 (Utah 
1992), the Utah Supreme Court dealt with remarkably similar jury 
instructions in a medical malpractice case. In Nielsen, the 
plaintiff claimed that Dr. Dickson, the anesthesiologist, was 
responsible for damage to dental work that she suffered during 
knee surgery. The plaintiff asserted both theories of res ipsa 
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loquitur and common law negligence against Dr. Dickson. In 
submitting the case to the jury, the trial judge gave conflicting 
jury instructions. The common knowledge exception was combined 
with a res ipsa loquitur instruction in Nielsen and was given as 
Instruction No. 22: 
The Court instructs you that in certain 
situations it is not necessary for the 
plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to 
present evidence of the defendants' 
negligence by expert testimony. Speci-
fically, where the propriety of the treatment 
received is within the common knowledge and 
experience of the layman, expert testimony is 
unnecessary to establish the standard of care 
owed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff must, 
however, establish by the evidence that: 
1. The accident was of a kind which, 
in the ordinary course of events, would not 
have happened had the defendant(s) used due 
care ; 
2. The instrument or thing causing the 
injury was at the time of the accident under 
the management and control of the 
defendant(s); and 
3. The accident happened irrespective 
of any participation at the time by the 
plaintiff. 
If you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that all three of the above criteria 
have been met, then you may find an inference 
of negligence from those circumstances. This 
does not mean that negligence is necessarily 
established, it merely creates an inference 
which may be rebutted by the defendant or 
defendants. 
830 P.2d at 272-73. The common knowledge portion of the first 
paragraph of Instruction No. 22 in Nielsen is essentially the 
same as Instruction No. 20 in this case. (See Addendum 2.) 
Certainly, the message to the jury is the same. In Nielsen, the 
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trial court also gave Instruction No. 19, which is essentially 
the same as Instruction No. 18 combined with Instruction No. 19 
in this case. (See Addendum 3.) 
In discussing the conflict between the Nixdorf 
instructions, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Instruction 19 is even more misleading, in 
sum, it prohibits the jury from using a 
professional standard of care derived from 
the jurors' own experience and requires them 
to rely only upon expert testimony in 
determining the standard. This is the exact 
opposite of what the common knowledge 
exception permits, which is the basis for the 
res ipsa loquitur theory. 
In the instant case, Instruction 22 informed 
the jury about the common knowledge exception 
and stated that expert testimony is not 
always needed to determine the standard of 
care. However, Instruction 19, which stated 
that expert testimony is the only way to 
ascertain the standard of care, directly 
contradicted Instruction 22. 
83 0 P.2d at 2 74. The Supreme Court went on to find that the 
instructions were prejudicially confusing to the jury. 
In the instant case, the potential for confusion is 
even greater than in Nielsen. In Nielsen, it could at least be 
argued -- and it was -- that one instruction (Instruction 19) 
went to the common knowledge negligence theory, and the common 
knowledge exception instruction (Instruction 22) went to the res 
ipsa loquitur theory. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, 
noting that the jury could not expected to sort out the 
confusion. In this case, Mrs. Brady's alternative theory of res 
ipsa loquitur was eliminated by Judge Bunnell at the close of the 
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plaintiff's evidence. (T. 1164-65.) Therefore, the case went to 
the jury on the single theory of common law negligence. 
Unfortunately, it went to the jury on that theory with two 
differing and conflicting standards. The resulting confusion 
could not be reconciled by the jury and constitutes prejudicial 
and reversible error. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
DR. BARRY COOK TO TESTIFY. 
Dr. Barry Cook is a Price optometrist who was permitted 
to testify as a rebuttal witness during the afternoon of the last 
day of trial. (T. 1371-91.) His testimony was arranged by 
Mrs. Brady's attorneys only hours before Dr. Cook actually 
testified: 
Q. When was the first time that you saw 
this lady between this day as you sit 
here in Court and September 1 of this 
year? 
A. I think I already testified that I saw 
her today. That's the first time I've 
seen her for many, many years. 
Q. When is the first time that you met her 
attorney, Mr. Humpherys? 
A. About ten minutes ago right outside 
here. 
Q. You don't have any medical records on 
her with regard to any complaints or 
problems associated with vision, do you? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, sir, you have not had her come to 
you and indicate that she has any 
peripheral problems in her vision; is 
that true? 
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A. Only with what she's been to me today. 
Q. Who brought her to you today? 
A. Keith Chiara, and she and her husband 
came into my office, yes. 
Q. Her attorney brought her over to your 
office today, right? 
A. Keith called this morning and asked if 
there was any way that I could render 
some help, and I said, "Fine. Let's do 
my lunch hour." 
(T. 1388-89, emphasis added.) Dr. Cook was permitted to testify 
that Mrs. Brady had 20/20 vision in her left eye, 20/60 vision in 
her right eye, and that she suffered from a peripheral vision 
defect in the right eye. (T. 1386.) Dr. Cook himself conceded 
the weakness of his testimony: 
Q. Now, regarding your opinion that 
Mrs. Brady's cornea impairs her 
vision -- her peripheral vision -- could 
you now explain how you reached that 
conclusion? 
A. Judging from what I just read over the 
lunch hour and over just this 
afternoon -- I didn't get a chance to 
really study as much as I would like 
to - - but I feel that part of her vision 
loss is due to the cornea, yes. 
(T. 1386.) Despite the fact that it was apparent that Dr. Cook 
was ill-prepared to testify and despite the fact that 
circumstances made it clear that Dr. Gibb could not have 
anticipated his testimony, Judge Bunnell permitted Dr. Cook to 
testify. Judge Bunnell's thinking is reflected in the Order: 
The court finds that the issue with respect 
to the admissibility of the testimony of 
Dr. Barry Cook and the admissibility of 
Exhibits 64 and 65 are very close calls. 
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However, the court finds that Dr. Cook's 
testimony was proper rebuttal concerning 
evidence relative to the condition of 
Mrs. Brady's eye after the injury and the way 
the eye had recovered. With respect to the 
issue of Dr. Cook's credibility as a local 
witness, the court finds that the claim made 
against Dr. Cook was written up in the papers 
and received notoriety in the community. The 
issue of the credibility of the witness is 
for the jury to take into account with the 
guidance of jury instructions on credibility 
of witnesses. The court further finds that 
it is a close call as to whether or not 
Dr. Cook's testimony and Exhibits 64 and 65 
constituted surprise. However, the court 
concludes that a new trial is not warranted 
on that basis because the evidence was proper 
rebuttal to the denial of the amount of 
damage. 
(R. 1804, Addendum 1.) 
A. 
DR. COOK WAS NOT A PROPER REBUTTAL WITNESS 
In Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant 
Gibb's Motion for New Trial and/or Remittitur, Mrs. Brady argues 
that Dr. Cook was called to rebut the testimony of Dr. Olsen. 
(R. 1626-2 7.) Mrs. Brady argued: 
During trial, defendants Xittrium, Baxter and 
Mountain View Hospital read the deposition of 
Dr. Randall Olsen, who testified that, in his 
opinion, Mrs. Brady had no residual permanent 
effects from her eye injury. When the 
defendants rested, Mrs. Brady called herself 
and Dr. Barry Cook, who testified concerning 
deficits in Mrs. Brady's peripheral 
vision. . . Here, Dr. Cook's testimony 
directly refuted that given by Dr. Olsen and, 
hence, was rebuttal testimony. 
(Id. citations omitted.) A review of the testimony at trial 
demonstrates that Dr. Cook was not a proper rebuttal witness and 
that his testimony was highly prejudicial. 
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In her case-in-chief, Mrs. Brady called Dr. Kevin 
Charlton, the ophthalmologist who performed several surgeries and 
the person who had been her treating ophthalmologist for over 
three years. Dr. Charlton had performed successful cataract 
surgery on Mrs. Brady on September 9, 1992, and had examined her 
on September 16, 1992, only six days before the trial began. 
Dr. Charlton testified: 
Q. What is her current visual acuity; 
meaning her current ability to see with 
glasses on? 
A. Okay. On my last examination, which was 
September 16th of '92, her vision with 
her glasses was a 20/30. 
Q. That's pretty good success? 
A. Yes, that's very good. 
Q. Now, is that as good as she would have 
had, but for this Exidine incident, if 
you know? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Okay. I guess we can ask her. At this 
time, doctor, is there anything further 
that you can see that needs to be done 
or could be done to improve her vision? 
A. No. 
(T. 693.) The record of Dr. Charlton's September 16, 1992 
examination was introduced into evidence. Dr. Charlton went on 
to explain that her visual acuity was 20/30 in both eyes, 
indicating that the acuity was the same in the eye that had not 
been affected by Exidine. (T. 700.) Dr. Charlton testified that 
she had "good functional vision, and she should be able to drive 
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and go about her daily tasks quite well." (T. 712.) 
Dr. Charlton did not mention any problem with peripheral vision 
whatsoever. To the contrary, he testified that Mrs. Brady had 
20/30 acuity in both eyes and had good functional vision. 
Despite the opportunity to do so, Mr. Humpherys did not ask his 
own witness -- the one person who was eminently qualified to 
address the issue -- any questions concerning peripheral vision. 
During the direct examination of Mrs. Brady, 
Mr. Humpherys brought up the subject of peripheral vision for the 
first time. (T. 1071.) Mr. Humpherys then proceeded to conduct 
a demonstration in the courtroom to supposedly demonstrate that 
Mrs. Brady suffered from problems with her peripheral vision. 
(T. 1071-72.) Mrs. Brady went so far as to testify that the 
alleged peripheral vision problem caused her to be afraid of 
falling down when walking down an incline or stepping down a 
step. (T. 1072.) This testimony came as a complete surprise to 
all defendants. (See Marjorie Brady Deposition exerpts, 
Addendum 4.) 
Xittrium then called Dr. Olsen to testify. Dr. Olsen 
was retained by Xittrium as an expert witness to testify against 
Dr. Gibb on the standard of care. Because Dr. Olsen was arguably 
critical of Dr. Gibb, Mr. Humpherys also offered Dr. Olsen as an 
expert witness. Mr. Humpherys' purpose in calling Dr. Olsen is 
illustrated in the following representation to Judge Bunnell: 
MR. HUMPHERYS: Thank you. There are going 
to be two areas he's (Dr. Olsen) going to 
address, Your Honor. He's going to address 
the fact that the use of copious amounts of 
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the Exidine in or around the eye is a breach 
of the standard of care and that the 
surgeons, during this period of time, were 
using it very carefully, if they used it at 
all, on the face. 
Second, he's going to be talking about the 
common knowledge of Exidine - - or I should 
say chlorhexidine gluconate and how it was 
widely known --in fact, he was going to be 
publishing articles on it and prepared 
articles for it. And it was widely discussed 
in all of the circles in his organizations 
and specialties. 
Finally, in some of the areas where Gary 
Stott did not read, there is - - this is where 
he specifically talks about the preparation 
of an area using a surgical scrub such as 
Exidine and how he is familiar with that. 
And I would like to have that read, unless 
the Court has already seen sufficient 
foundation. I don't want to waste any 
additional time. If the Court wants to read 
additional, I will have Mr. Jones read some 
additional areas. 
(T. 1323-24.) Rather than being a witness whose testimony gave 
rise to a need for rebuttal testimony, Mr. Humpherys' 
representations to the Court made it clear that Dr. Olsen was 
Mrs. Brady's own witness. 
Because Dr. Olsen was not present at trial, his entire 
testimony was read from his deposition of September 14, 1992. 
During the direct examination by Mr. Sampson, Dr. Olsen rendered 
opinions that were critical of Dr. Gibb. At the very end of his 
examination, he touched briefly on Mrs. Brady's current 
condition: 
But even at her present level, she certainly 
has had a good result and has an eye with 
good function. And that appears that she has 
an excellent prognosis and she'll maintain 
that. 
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(T. 1336.) Mr. Humpherys then followed with a number of 
questions that were directed solely toward eliciting opinions 
that were critical of Dr. Gibb. (T. 1336-40.) In the 
fifty-three pages that comprise the testimony of Dr. Olsen in the 
trial transcript (T. 1306-59), the only reference to Mrs. Brady's 
current condition is found in the five lines quoted above. 
Dr. Olsen never mentioned peripheral vision. He did not offer 
any testimony that could reasonably be viewed as countering 
Mrs. Brady's surprise testimony about peripheral vision. 
Dr. Olsen was an expert witness who was offered by Xittrium and 
Mrs. Brady herself to be critical of Dr. Gibb and his testimony 
did not provide a proper reason for bringing Dr. Barry Cook in to 
testify at the eleventh hour. 
Defendants presented their entire cases without even 
mentioning a possible deficit in the peripheral vision of 
Mrs. Brady's right eye. On rebuttal, Mrs. Brady was then 
permitted to take the stand a second time and reiterate her prior 
testimony, mentioned for the first time at trial, about a 
peripheral vision deficit. (T. 1368-70.) Immediately following 
Mrs. Brady's testimony, Dr. Barry Cook was called by 
Mr. Humpherys. The following exchange took place: 
MR. HUMPHERYS: Your Honor, we have one final 
witness, Dr. Barry Cook, an optometrist here 
locally in Price. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HUMPHERYS: If I could, Your Honor, since 
I've not had the chance to meet with him this 
afternoon, could I have five minutes to meet 
with him? 
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THE COURT: All right. We'll give you five 
minutes. 
MR. HUMPHERYS: He's a rebuttal witness to 
this testimony. We have been hustling to get 
this ready. 
(T. 1370-71, emphasis added.) While Mr. Humpherys characterized 
Dr. Cook as a "rebuttal witness" the reference to attempting to 
rebut "this testimony" was unclear. (Id.) Mrs. Brady now argues 
that "this testimony" refers to Dr. Olsen. As has been shown, 
Dr. Olsen did not offer testimony that permitted rebuttal 
evidence. 
Rebuttal testimony is discussed at length in 75 AM. JUR. 
2d, Trial, § 365 et seq. The authors state: 
Rebuttal is evidence given to prove, 
disprove, explain, repel, or contradict the 
evidence of the adversary party. 
Id. at 566 (1991) (emphasis added). The authors also state: 
The standard for determining whether a 
rebuttal witness should be allowed to testify 
when such witness's name was not timely 
identified is dependent upon whether the 
testimony sought to be rebutted could 
reasonably have been anticipated prior to 
trial. Thus, where the relevance and 
existence of rebuttal evidence is not known 
until the other side has presented its case, 
the trial court does not commit an abuse of 
discretion by permitting the rebuttal 
although the rebuttal witness was not listed 
prior to trial. However, a previously 
undisclosed rebuttal witness may offer 
testimony only about that which tends to 
counteract new matter offered by the adverse 
party. 
In determining whether to deny a party the 
right to call a rebuttal witness, the trial 
court should weigh the possibility of 
substantial prejudice against the denial of 
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the right to present the proffered testimony. 
Id. at § 371, pp. 570-71 (emphasis added). 
Permitting Dr. Cook to testify as a rebuttal witness 
was improper for two reasons. First, the testimony sought to be 
rebutted was known to all parties prior to trial. Only two 
persons could conceivably have addressed the issue of a 
peripheral vision deficit--Dr. Charlton and Dr. Olsen. 
Dr. Charlton was Mrs. Brady's treating physician and was deposed 
prior to trial. Dr. Olsen was a witness for Xittrium, Baxter and 
Mountain View Hospital and Mrs. Brady and was also deposed prior 
to trial. Therefore, Mr. Humpherys knew full well what both 
individuals were going to say. Having Dr. Cook testify about a 
peripheral vision deficit did not rebut unanticipated testimony. 
Second, undisclosed rebuttal witnesses may testify only 
about new matters offered by the adverse party. Dr. Gibb did not 
offer any new evidence whatsoever concerning the presence or 
absence of a peripheral vision deficit in Mrs. Brady. 
Mr. Humpherys created the peripheral vision issue himself by 
having Mrs. Brady testify about the deficit for the first time at 
trial. (T. 1071-72, 1086-89.) Mr. Humpherys then brought in 
Dr. Cook and had him testify about a new matter that he himself 
had created. This use of "rebuttal" testimony is completely 
improper and was highly prejudicial to Dr. Gibb. 
Rebuttal evidence is "evidence which tends to answer or 
explain his adversary's evidence." Soliz v. Ammerman, 16 Utah 2d 
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11, 395 P.2d 25, 26 (1964). In Board of Educ. v. Barton, 617 
P.2d 347 (Utah 1980) , the Supreme Court stated: 
Rebuttal evidence is that which tends to 
refute, or to so modify or explain, as to 
nullify or minimize the effect of the 
opponent's evidence. 
Id. (citation omitted). See also, Randle v. Allen, 223 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 6, 11 (Utah 1993) (citing Board of Educ. v. Barton); Jenson 
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 49 P.2d 958 (Utah 1935). The Utah Supreme 
Court's position underscores the fact that rebuttal testimony is 
proper only to address the opponent's evidence, not to 
substantiate a party's new trial testimony. In this case, Mrs. 
Brady's own witness, Dr. Charlton, testified that she had 20/30 
vision. (T. 693, 700.) Despite conducting numerous thorough 
tests, Dr. Charlton failed to detect any peripheral vision 
defect. Again, this testimony is from Mrs. Brady's own treating 
physician, an individual who had been thoroughly deposed before 
trial. 
The nature of rebuttal testimony is discussed further 
in the Supreme Court of Alaska decision in Sirotiak v. H.C. Price 
Co.. 758 P.2d 1271 (Alaska 1988) . In Sirotiak. the plaintiff 
filed suit and claimed damages as a result of an intersection 
collision. Plaintiff Sirotiak attempted to introduce the 
testimony of two witnesses in rebuttal after he had completed his 
case in chief. Finding that the proposed rebuttal witness was 
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not on the plaintiff's witness list, that the plaintiff was not 
surprised by the defense theory and that the testimony sought to 
be rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior to 
trial, the Sirotiak court upheld the trial court's refusal to 
permit the rebuttal testimony and stated: 
In general, evidence which is necessary to 
prove a prima facie case should be presented 
in the plaintiff's case in chief. Although 
the plaintiff is not required to anticipate 
defenses as part of its case in chief, the 
plaintiff may not ignore known defense 
theories or close his or her eyes to evidence 
that directly counters plaintiff's prima 
facie case. 
Id. at 1278 (emphasis added, citations omitted). In this case, 
Mr. Humpherys chose to close his eyes to the testimony of 
Dr. Charlton as well as the testimony of Dr. Olsen. The 
deposition testimony of Dr. Olsen was known to Mr. Humpherys well 
before trial. It was incumbent upon Mr. Humpherys to find a 
witness such as Dr. Cook well before trial and to advise defense 
counsel of the identity of the witness as well as the nature of 
his testimony. The failure to do so and the attempt to 
characterize it as "rebuttal evidence" for the first time at the 
end of trial is improper. 
The testimony of Dr. Cook is not a matter that can be 
dismissed as something insignificant. Introducing testimony that 
Mrs. Brady suffered from a peripheral vision deficit as well as 
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from di mi ni shed v i si on of 2 0 t 60 :i n tl le r :i girt: eye changed tl le 
entire complexion of the damages i n thi s case. The testimony of 
Dr. Cook came as a complete surprise to counsel for Dr. Gibb. 
Goi ng :i i it: :> the t] : :i all Dr G:i bb a ntJ cipated that Mrs , Brady' s own 
treating physician would testify that the v ision In her right eye 
was 2 0/30, the same as the vision in the eyp that, had, not been 
exposed 1 n Kxl , Despite having been examined by several 
ophthalmologists and having been seen by Di, Charlton as recently 
a s s j _ x 3 a y S before trial (i i,f, men V. ion was <-~.n »r-* v made of a 
peripheral vision dHticir.. At the end of r. rial and with no 
notice, counsel had absolutely no meaningful way to address the 
test::! monj ' of Dr Coc k. 
DR. COOK WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO RENDER AN 
OPINION AS TO THE PRESENCE OR CAUSE OF 
THE CLAIMED PERIPHERAL VISION DEFICIT. 
Fr - •. - :'.;=*] ' r.i'-•o * • - lei'ier medical opinions 
<ib * tt: - -. . : s conditio- •• - r^r^ •• :his cas^" "-id the 
i- - ' .... .-..oqdsts :;; .:he iState 
ot. L i d h % . ' :--ii f p . ' , e n t - •*; t i, d a m a g e 5 •. ' .-- c o r n e a . 
Dr rha.rlKy: 1 ;- " - • o n e r o u s o p p o r t u n i t i e s L> .- " :s Br ady 
• ' ^ r p n t p-rnn^Hiires. Tj~ o i . c e i v a b l e 
tr.a- i<- / ; i 8 ^ )f t i e a t ;:K; !*!•-> MI \ :\ \ >-., , r ;ei t h r e e 
y e a r s , LL . J u d i i u u i i wuuiu . . M'aL 
vision deficit. It is equally unlikely that he would err in the 
measurement of her visual acuity. To find Dr. Cook to be 
qualified to testify about complicated issues of a specialized 
area of ophthalmology is improper. To permit him to so testify 
after the most cursory examination of Mrs. Brady in the middle of 
trial is also prejudicial error. 
C. 
DR. COOK WAS A SURPRISE WITNESS WHO SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO TESTIFY. 
Mrs. Brady argues that Dr. Cook was not a surprise 
witness because Mr. Humpherys "notified" counsel for Dr. Gibb 
about Dr. Cook during the noon break immediately preceding 
Dr. Cook's testimony. Ignoring for a moment the fact that there 
is no evidence in the record of any such "notice," the fact 
remains that Mrs. Brady misunderstands the nature of surprise 
testimony as a basis for a new trial. In Anderson v. Bradley, 
590 P.2d 339 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In any event, surprise as a ground for a new 
trial is only that which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. 
Id. In this case, Mr. Stott had no way of guarding against the 
surprise use of Dr. Cook as a witness. Counsel had filed 
interrogatories which sought the identification of all witnesses 
well before trial. Dr. Cook was never identified as a possible 
witness. Furthermore, Dr. Cook was never identified in the 
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>a ^ourt , 
J
 .)•> - v-i precaut 
surprise witness l i *- I r 
u s ;',very s e e * t -> p r e v e n t . 
*~') j iv w a s , , a T ' : IS 
-• . - v at f r : ^ i 808- 10 . ) rhere fore , 
,r : or,K ' •< ..».- M-ts aot d i s c i os^-i v f i potential jurors. This 
o m i s s i o n has spec ± a., as*- thai was t r i e d in a 
sma3 1 community •» r» ^ . i. *aan\ J»* j u r o r s were l i k e l y t o know 
the p h y s i c i a n s w*v . •<; t e s t i f y . • "*- c a s e . The problem i s 
i l l i i s t r a t e d va tl i Ji ldge Bi :i i:ii ie] ] ' s me nt:j on :: f Di Etz e l : 
THE COURT: I'm sure you haven't had any 
association with people in Chicago that work 
for any one of those companies, do you? any 
of you? Thank you, Mr. Humpherys 
Now, ladies and gentlemen, any ol- you r H a t e d 
by blood or marriage to any of the 
witnesses - - probably the one we'd be 
concerned about would be Dr. Etzel. Any of 
you have a close association with Dr. Etzel? 
I'm sure some of you know him. In fact, some 
of you may be patients. 
a :'an. jurors -- Mr. Davis, Ms. Juvan, 
Ms. Decat. v iachele, Ms. Barker, s^ Nielsen, Ms. Reals and 
Mr . rr^t uiu *• UL. ntzei. 3 9 2 5 5 , 16 ] ) I f 
e - j. • noten; •.. juror? knew T\ iizel , one can reasonably 
conclude tij-n . :m: .ar number * . a .ij.. e known Dr. Cook. As 
o auara n -^ -.n^ a \ l e ,sa a: a 
*':
 ;
 ' uj-e lu iuent " * !ook 
wa.. a our modern . > .- ;:: 
> 1 1 
Judge Bunnell pointed out, many would likely have been Dr. Cook's 
patients. It is reasonable to assume that a potential juror 
would lend greater credence to the testimony of his or her own 
treating optometrist. Mr. Stott was entitled to know about this 
information during the jury selection process. This right was 
denied when Dr. Cook was held out from Mrs. Brady's case in chief 
and belatedly inserted as a "rebuttal witness." 
The surprise use of Dr. Cook also precluded Mr. Stott 
from doing a thorough investigation of Dr. Cook and his actual 
qualifications to testify as an expert witness. Counsel for 
Dr. Gibb have learned that Dr. Cook was named as a respondent in 
a medical malpractice action involving the allegedly negligent 
diagnosis of a corneal ulceration. Some of the details relating 
to this claim are set forth in the Notice of Intent to Commence 
Legal Action which is attached to Dr. Gibb's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for New Trial and/or Remittitur as Exhibit "A." 
(R. 1578-80.) While probably not admissible by itself, this type 
of information may well lead to the discovery of a pattern of 
such claims for other admissible evidence. Without having had 
the opportunity to depose Dr. Cook, Mr. Stott had no way of 
learning about the claim of Doris Rarick or any other claims 
against Dr. Cook. As it turns out, Mr. Stott may have been the 
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only p e r s o n s Vvh< d id mil !• u. w about I hf r I \ i m a q a o i s t h Cook, 
As Judge Bunnell disclosed in the Order, 
With respect to the issue of Di, ^aok's 
credibility as a local witness, the Court 
finds that the claim made against Dr. Cook 
was written up in the papers and received 
notor:^*"v i r th^ community. 
(R. 1 804, Addendum --;-• rr.- "notoriety" tend to make 'jurors 
more or 1 ess ••. ^ .. : ook? obviously, the answer to 
that and other oxes\ ions cannot be known. The point is that 
counsel for Dr. UIJJJJ were entitled this information wel ] before 
tr ia ] "The surprise use of Dr. Cook as a "rebuttaJ" witness 
denied counsel a meaningful opportunity to find out about 
Dr. Cook, learn at :ml his methods and assess his tine 
qualifications ap -m expert witness. Without, this opportunity, 
counsel had no meaningful way to cross examine Dr. Cook at trial. 
PERMITTING DR. COOK TO TESTIFY WAS PLAIN ERROR. 
K • ;• -A provides as 
follows: 
Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes 
taking notice of plain errors affecting 
substantial rights although they were not 
brought to the attention of the court. 
£ . - Bnr\ ^lowinq Dr. 
Cook o testify *;*- * \ :i errs, :«'7*' :* :^._.ui:i tav-j been 
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obvious to Judge Bunnell that he was committing error in 
permitting the introduction of exhibits 64 and 65 into evidence. 
(T. 1376.) These exhibits purported to reflect results of a test 
called "a visual field." The visual field was explained as a 
"series of spots or lights that are projected so that we can 
evaluate the side vision of Mrs. Brady." (T. 1374.) Even 
without Mr. Stott's objection as to foundation for these 
exhibits, the court permitted their introduction without knowing 
whether the visual field test was appropriate to diagnose a 
peripheral vision loss in a patient with cornea damage, whether 
Dr. Cook had ever performed a single visual field test on another 
patient before Mrs. Brady, whether the equipment used was proper 
or was properly maintained, adjusted or calibrated and whether 
the visual field test had ever been recognized in any court of 
law as a scientifically recognized test for measuring peripheral 
vision loss. 
It should have been obvious to Judge Bunnell that 
permitting Exhibits 64 and 65 to go to the jury in the manner in 
which they did was plain error. These exhibits gave the jurors 
something tangible to review during their deliberations on 
liability and damages -- something tangible that had never even 
been mentioned by Mr. Humpherys before the exhibits showed up in 
court on the last day of trial. It is interesting to note that 
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Mr. Hi impher ys floes i lot: asser t: tl la t tl lese exi li bi ts w ei e iiientii oned 
in the so-called "new notice"1 of Di: Cook's upcoming testimony 
ri"--. eleventh-hoi IT n^p of such exhibi ts should have immediately 
•."--* • • ; " t o l..lIP u n f a i r ness and tl: le prejudicial 
effect the exhibits would have on the right to Dr. Gibb to have a 
fair oppor*: .:rr! • • t.o review and possibly rebut the p-xh ib;i l;.s , 
•MI 1 L'om the transcript of Dr. Cook's testimony 
that the -* was anxious to conclude the trial ("C" 1367-68, 
137 1 ^ N veiiheless, the haste to conclude the proceedings does 
jiol fnovide an excuse for denying Dr. Gibb the fair opportunity 
to know about and moot Dr , Cook's testimony and Exhibits 64 and 
65. The plain solul ion wuulil hivi* l^ -oii fm 1 ho (iiuit I pi^i/enl 
Dr. Cook from testifying. The failure to do so was plain error. 
i. 
TESTIMONY I I fto 
Until ok testified, : u- -violence before the jury 
from ophthalmologists was that Mrs, Brady had good functional 
visio , Hoc (, y in ophthalmologist , Di . Chai'H on, had testified 
that the corrected vision in both eyes was 2 0/3(1, (T, i-i'-M, 700 ) 
In other words, the vision in the eye that had been exposed to 
Exidine «V.K; no different Mian L f i *- vision in the eye that had 
changed only from natural aging or other unrelated factors. No 
mention was made of a peripheral vit •- >~J i 
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critical point in the trial, an unknown optometrist was permitted 
to testify. Under the commonly accepted principles of primacy 
and recency of evidence, the time immediately before the case is 
submitted to the jury is critical. Mr. Humpherys made the most 
of this advantage by calling Dr. Cook at the end of the evidence 
and then vigorously emphasizing Dr. Cook's testimony in his 
closing argument. 
Mr. Humpherys argued: 
The third category is disability, and this is 
not an insignificant item either. You heard 
how her peripheral vision has been 
significantly affected, her depth perception. 
And this become particularly important as you 
grow older; when your body isn't quite as 
agile and your reflexes aren't quite as quick 
and your balance isn't quite as sharp, and 
you don't have that depth perception. We 
start to become disabled because you can't 
move like you could before. You can't see 
the way you should. You can't drive in a 
safe manner because of the inability to see 
what's going on to the side of you. There is 
a significant disability associated with the 
loss of sight. 
Now her central vision is okay. Dr. Charlton 
said 20/30. Dr. Cook said 20/60. It doesn't 
matter. I don't care what the difference is. 
It's okay, the central vision. The central 
vision means where her eye is actually 
looking at the time she is focusing. But the 
surrounding vision is what is impaired and 
significantly impaired. 
(T. 1474-75.) 
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She's at a higher risk of accident because of 
her depth perception and her peripheral 
vision being impaired. 
(T. 1 4 76, ) 
I ii: I I/i in ipher y s cl osed b;y saying i 
Now, I have to confess that wl id ch I did 
yesterday -- that Dr. Cook was requested by 
us to look at her eye. And the reason why is 
because of what they read from, Dr. Olsen, who 
had never examined Mrs. Brady. And in the 
deposition testimony he said, "I expect 
she'll have no problems with her vision. She 
will live a normal life and do everything 
she'll need to do." That isn't what 
Dr. Charlton said. But in light of what 
Dr. Olsen said and since they told us they 
were going to read that deposition that day, 
I though (sic), "No, that's not right. We 
better find out, because this is our last 
chance to talk to you about it. We better 
find out: what her vision really is concerning 
her peripheral vision." Dr. Charlton only 
measured her central vision. And so that's . 
why that was done. And I freely admit that I 
requested that and suggested that and Keith 
carried it out. And thank goodness we did, 
because she would not be compensated, nor 
would you understand the depth and scope of 
her injuries, had I not done that. I'm not 
ashamed of that. That wasn't fabricated. 
Then it dawned on me. And that's why we 
brought in Dr. Cook to make sure that you 
understood the scope and the extent of her 
injuries. 
("!". 153 5 -36. ) 
1. -• • '-.... vision •: j, in' t ma11 er" t o Mr, Humphe rys . 
The supposed peripheral vision problem di d, The peripheral 
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vision was the focus of his argument to the jury that Mrs. Brady 
should be compensated. Mrs. Brady herself had testified that the 
peripheral vision problem was the "main thing": 
Q. Okay. Other than those problems, you 
don't have any other difficulties with 
your right eye, do you -- those that 
we've now talked about? 
A. This side vision and that is the main 
thing right now. 
(T. 1086.) The peripheral vision was turned into the main issue 
of damages through Dr. Cook's testimony. Dr. Gibb had absolutely 
no way to meaningfully contest Dr. Cook's testimony. Without 
Dr. Cook's testimony, the value of the case was measured by the 
undeniable inconvenience and pain and suffering related to the 
cornea transplant and the residual problems of the dryness in the 
eye. With Dr. Cook's testimony, the value of the case changed 
dramatically to an eye with 20/60 acuity and peripheral vision 
deficits that put Mrs. Brady at risk for a number of different 
speculative future problems. The award of $300,000 in general 
damages speaks volumes. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury instructions given in this case permitted the 
jury to impermissibly decide the case as if it involved no more 
complicated than tasks which each of the jurors faced in everyday 
life. The education, training, experience and skill involved in 
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the operation performed by Dr.. Gibb are not: such simple matters. 
Tn& standard oi" ••a1- ^-MPt be defined by expert testimony and the 
I i 11: :i 1 :i z e on3 ) expert t es t imony in 
assessing Dr. Gibb'^ negligence, The jury i nstructions given in 
this ^as& permit* ed a. departi ire from the pi: sper ] egal standard 
a .. . - _, .-.- ^r reversal The testimony of Dr Barry Cook 
came as a complete s-irprise to counsel for Dr. Gibb and cannot be 
explained avn-.- •: •- - < - / ' al test: mon> The err or committed :i i i 
permitting Dr. , Cook t.o testify is also grounds for reversal 
Gibb respectfully requests that the judgment of the trial court 
be reversed and l: 'h< ,'ase remanded N,i ,i n»ri i t i i . i l . 
DATED this ^ d a y ot November, 1993. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
GARY D. STOTT 
CURTIS J. DRAKE 
NATHAN R. HYDE 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Dr. Randal B. Gibb 
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GARY D. STOTT [A313 0] 
CURTIS J. DRAKE [A091Q] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party 
Defendant Randal B. Gibb, M.D. 
50 South Main Street 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. BRADY 
and MARJORIE A. BRADY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
a Division of PACIFICORP, an 
Oregon corporation, ANNETTE 
GRIMM, MOUNTAIN VIEW 
HOSPITAL, DR. RANDAL B. 
GIBB, DR. CLISTO D. BEATY, 
XITTRIUM LABORATORIES, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendants. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
ORDER RE: 
POST-TRIAL MOTIONS 
Civil No. 900700158PI 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
a Division of PACIFICORP, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL 
and DR. RANDAL B. GIBB, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
001 St.* 0 
The Motion of defendant/third-party defendant 
Dr. Randal B. Gibb ("Dr. Gibb") for New Trial and/or Remittitur and 
the Motion of defendants/third-party defendants Xittrium 
Laboratories and Baxter Healthcare Corporation and defendant 
Mountain View Hospital ("Xittrium", "Baxter" and "Mountain View 
Hospital", respectively) for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 
New Trial and/or Remittitur came regularly before the court on the 
5th day of March, 1993 at the hour of 1:30 p.m. Plaintiff 
Marjorie A. Brady ("Mrs. Brady") appeared by and through her 
counsel, L. Rich Humpherys; defendant Dr. Gibb appeared by and 
through his counsel, Curtis J. Drake; and defendants Xittrium, 
Baxter and Mountain View Hospital appeared by and through their 
counsel, Charles P. Sampson and Bruce T. Jones. The court 
considered the above motions, memoranda in support thereof, 
previously filed pleadings and the evidence submitted at the time 
of trial, together with all other information contained in the 
court's file, and found and concluded as follows: 
1. For the reasons set forth in Plaintiff's Directed 
Verdict on the Statute of Limitation Defense, the court concludes 
that the statute of limitation contained in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-15-3 (as amended) does not bar Mrs. Brady's claim against 
Xittrium and Baxter. 
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nm on . 
2. The court cannot conclude as a matter of law that 
the negligence, if any, of Dr. Gibb was a superseding cause of 
Mrs. Brady's injuries, thereby precluding the proximate cause of 
the other defendants' fault. The issue of causation was an issue 
of fact that was properly presented to the jury to determine. 
3. Plaintiffs did not initially allege that Xittrium 
and Baxter were negligent; however, Dr. Gibb raised the issue of 
Xittrium's and Baxter's negligence and sought to have such 
negligence, together will all other fault, apportioned by the jury 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (as amended). Evidence on 
the issue of said negligence was submitted to the jury during the 
trial. The court deemed it appropriate and necessary to have the 
jury consider and apportion said negligence as part of determining 
the fault proximately causing Mrs. Brady's injuries. Even if it 
was improper for the court to have the issue of Xittrium's and 
Baxter's negligence considered by the jury, the court finds and 
concludes that it was harmless error since the jury found the 
product defective and unreasonably dangerous, which finding was 
supported by substantial evidence. The jury's apportionment of 
fault to Xittrium and Baxter did not appear excessive in light of 
the evidence. 
4. The court properly permitted Dr. Fraunfelder to 
testify regarding the alleged improper actions of Mountain View 
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Hospital. Dr. Fraunfelder's opinions were not precluded merely 
because he did not mention them in his deposition. It does not 
appear that counsel for Mountain View Hospital specifically asked 
Dr. Fraunfelder whether he had any opinions regarding the actions 
of Mountain View Hospital and whether he thereafter intended to 
form any such opinions. Counsel for Mountain View Hospital did not 
even ask if Dr. Fraunf elder had any other opinions; however, the 
question was asked by another attorney. Even if counsel for 
Mountain View Hospital had asked if Dr. Fraunfelder had any other 
opinions, such general question is overly broad and can be unfairly 
used to conclusively restrict an expert's opinion as the case 
develops after the deposition. Under certain circumstances, it may 
be unfair to allow an expert to give additional opinions. However, 
in this case, the opinions of Dr. Fraunf elder against Mountain View 
Hospital did not unduly prejudice the hospital, particularly in 
light of all other evidence, the position of Xittrium and Baxter, 
and the ultimate determination of fault by the jury. 
5. The court concludes and finds that the payments by 
defendant/third-party plaintiff Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&L") 
to the plaintiffs were based on advances toward UP&L's liability as 
a tort feasor and not a collateral source. Under such 
circumstances, the payments made by UP&L do not fall within the 
definition of collateral source as defined by Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 78-14-4.5 (as amended). For this reason, Mountain View Hospital 
is not entitled to a set off for said payments under said Section 
of the Code. The obligation of UP&L did not arise out of any 
collateral duty or agreement outside of its tort liability. 
6. The court finds that the issue with respect to the 
admissibility of the testimony of Dr. Barry Cook and the 
admissibility of Exhibits 64 and 65 are very close calls. However, 
the court finds that Dr. Cook's testimony was proper rebuttal 
concerning evidence relative to the condition of Mrs. Brady's eye 
after the injury and the way the eye had recovered. With respect 
to the issue of Dr. Cook's credibility as a local witness, the 
court finds that the claim made against Dr. Cook was written up in 
the papers and received notoriety in the community. The issue of 
the credibility of the witness is for the jury to take into account 
with the guidance of jury instructions on credibility of witnesses. 
The court further finds that it is a close call as to whether or 
not Dr. Cook's testimony and Exhibits 64 and 65 constituted 
surprise. However, the court concludes that a new trial is not 
warranted on that basis because the evidence was proper rebuttal to 
the denial of the amount of damage. 
7. The court cannot conclude as a matter of law that 
the amount awarded in general damages was excessive in light of all 
5 
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of the evidence. Mrs. Brady sustained a serious eye injury and 
there was substantial evidence to support the award. 
8. With respect to the question of conflicting jury 
instructions, the court finds that a common knowledge exception to 
the requirement for expert testimony exists. The common knowledge 
exception applied to establishing the duty of care in this case. 
The common knowledge exception would also apply and, at the same 
time, expert testimony was required to establish whether or not 
there was a duty of care and whether or not there was a breach of 
that duty. Instruction No. 18 and Instruction No. 20 were given in 
an attempt to answer both of the rulings of the Utah Supreme Court 
in this area. The court notes that both Instruction No. 18 and 
Instruction No. 20 are in the proposed uniform jury instructions 
without any explanation except the citations to the cases from 
which they come. Both instructions are recognized and it is an 
extremely close call as to whether or not the jury would be mislead 
by giving both instructions. The court finds that any error in 
giving the instructions would be more or less harmless since there 
was sufficient evidence by way of expert testimony from which the 
jury could find malpractice on the part of Dr. Gibb. If the giving 
of the instructions is in error, some exception and clarification 
to the proposed uniform jury instructions needs to be given by the 
Supreme Court. 
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9. The proposed Plaintiff's Directed Verdict on Statute 
of Limitation Defense should be modified to read that the court 
specifically finds that the plaintiffs were aware that Exidine had 
caused the injury to Mrs. Brady's right eye by August 7, 1989. 
Otherwise, the plaintiffs' proposed order appears to accurately 
reflect the court's ruling. 
Based upon the above findings and conclusions, together 
with the other points and arguments of plaintiffs as contained in 
their memoranda in opposition to defendants' various motions, the 
court denies all post judgment motions. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Dr. Gibb's Motion for New Trial and/or Remittitur is 
denied. 
2. Xittrium, Baxter and Mountain View Hospital's Motion 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, a New Trial and/or 
Remittitur is hereby denied. 
DATED this ^5V day of /^^// , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
-fiONORABLE/fiOYt) BUNNEU; 
/ ^ - S e v e n t h / D i s t r i c t JGcige 
Approved as to form: 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
By: 
L. RICH HUMPHERYS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
By: 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party 
Defendants Mountain View Hospital, 
Inc., Xittrium Laboratories and 
Baxter Healthcare Corporation 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on 
this ~^ 3, \A day of April, 1993, to the following counsel of record: 
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Keith H. Chiara, Esq. 
37 East Main Street 
P.O. Box 955 
Price, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Stephen B. Nebeker, Esq. 
Rick L. Rose, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party 
Plaintiff Utah Power & Light Company and 
Defendant Annette Grimm 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq. 
Bruce T. Jones, Esq. 
Charles P. Sampson, Esq. 
Paul M. Simmons, Esq. 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party 
Defendants Mountain View Hospital, Inc., 
Xittrium Laboratories and Baxter Healthcare 
Corporation 
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J. Anthony Eyre, Esq. 
William W. Barrett, Esq. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Clisto D. Beaty 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. BRADY and MARJORIE A. ] 
BRADY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a ] 
Division of PACIFICORP, an ] 
Oregon corporation, ANNETTE ] 
GRIMM, MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL, ] 
DR. RANDAL B. GIBB, DR. CLISTO ] 
D. BEATY, XITTRIUM LABORATORIES,] 
a Delaware corporation, ] 
Defendants, 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a 
Division of PACIFICORP, an ] 
Oregon corporation, ] 
Third-Party ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL and 
DR. RANDAL B. GIBB, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF THE COURT 
) ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS 
i Civil No. 900700158PI 
The attorneys for the plaintiffs and for Dr. Randal B. 
Gibb have each submitted to the Court a proposed order relative to 
the Court's rulings on post-trial motions heard by the Court and 
ruled upon from the bench on March 5, 1993. 
001 70 
The Court has considered both proposed orders and the 
objection filed, and has concluded that in the very limited area 
where the Proposed Orders disagree, that the proposed order 
submitted by counsel for Dr. Gibb sufficiently and adequately 
states the rulings of the Court. 
Therefore, the Court has this day signed and filed the 
Order submitted by Gary D. Scott and Curtis J. Drake, attorneys for 
Dr. Gibb. 
DATED this 3 ^ - day of May, 1993. 
-2-
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CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the above entitled ORDER OF THE COURT ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS by 
depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
Gary D. Stott 
Curtis J. Drake 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys at Law 
50 South Main Street 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
P. O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City UT 84110-2465 
Keith H. Chiara 
Attorney at Lawis 
37 East Main Street 
Price UT 84501 
L. Rich Humpherys 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys at Law 
175 South West Temple, #510 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. 
Bruce T. Jones 
Charles P. Sampson 
Paul M. Simmons 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys at Law 
700 Clark Learning Office center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City UT 84101-1480 
Stephen B. Nebeker 
Rich L Rose 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, Suite 400 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City UT 84145-0385 
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J. Anthony Eyre 
William W. Barrett 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys at Law 
City Centre I, Suite 330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
5*£*ix DATED this S> ^  day of May, 1993 
Secretary 
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ADDENDUM 2 
INSTRUCTION No. 2£ 
Expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the 
standard of care owed to the plaintiff by defendant Dr. Randall 
B. Gibb and Mountain View Hospital in a medical malpractice case 
where the medical procedure is of a kind, or the outcome so 
offends commonly held notions of medical propriety, that the 
standards of care can be established by the common knowledge, 
experience and understanding of a layman. 
Instrc7 
n f\ H r \ H« 
ADDENDUM 3 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the 
opinions of a witness to be received as evidence. An exception 
to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses 
who, by education, study and experience, have become expert in 
some art, science, profession or calling, may state opinions as 
to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an 
expert, so long as it is material and relevant to the case. You 
should consider such expert opinion and the reasons, if any, 
given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the 
weight you think it deserves. If you should decide that the 
opinions of an expert witness are not based upon sufficient 
education and experience, or if you should conclude that the 
reasons given in support of the opinions are not sound, or that 
such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard 
the opinion entirely. 
c 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In deciding whether a physician properly fulfilled his 
or her duties, you are not permitted to use a standard derived 
from your own experience with physicians nor any other standard 
of your own. 
A physician is required to exercise the same degree of 
learning, care, skill and treatment ordinarily possessed and used 
by other qualified physicians in good standing practicing in the 
same medical field. The law does not require that a physician 
exercise the highest degree of care. It requires the physician 
to exercise the degree of care that other qualified physicians 
would ordinarily exercise under the same circumstances. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The only way you may properly learn the applicable 
standard of care and determine whether or not the defendant 
physicians conformed to it is through evidence presented during 
this trial by individuals testifying as expert witnesses who knew 
of that standard as it existed at that time, and by other 
evidence admitted for the purpose of defining the standard of 
care. 
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INSTRUCTION '(f / 
In resolving any conflict that may exist in the 
testimony of medical experts, you may compare and weigh the 
opinion of one expert against that of another. In doing this, 
you may consider the relative qualifications and credibility of 
the expert witnesses, as well as the reasons for each opinion and 
the facts and other matters on which such opinions are based. 
INSTRUCTION NO .0 
The fact that an expert witness resides or pursues the 
profession in another state or community should not affect the 
weight you give the witness7 testimony. A party may rely upon 
qualified experts from other states and countries in presenting 
evidence to the jury. 
,1 
INSTRUCTION NO. S J 2. 
A physician who undertakes to treat a patient does not 
guarantee that no complications will occur or that no adverse 
results will be experienced because of the treatment. The fact 
that a complication or adverse result occurs does not, by itself, 
imply or prove that the physician was negligent. 
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ADDENDUM 4 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
ooOoo 
ROBERT C. BRADY and 
MARJORIE A. BRADY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
a Division of PACIFICORP, an 
Oregon corporation, ANNETTE 
GRIMM, MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL, 
DR. RANDAL B. GIBB, and 
DR. CLISTO D. BEATY, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 900700158PI 
Deposition of: 
MARJORIE A. BRADY 
CERTIFIED 
COPY 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
a Division of PACIFICORP# 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL and 
DR. RANDAL B. GIBB, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
-ooOoo 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 26th day of July, 1991, 
the deposition of MARJORIE A. BRADY, produced as a witness 
herein at the instance of the Defendants Utah Power & Light and 
Annette Grimm herein, in the above-entitled action now pending 
in the above-named court, was taken before Ann M. Calder, a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 10:35 a.m. of said day 
at Carbon County Courthouse, 149 East 100 South, Price, County 
of Carbon, State of Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Notice. 
ANN M. CALDER 
CSRNo. 139 
INDEPENDENT REPORTING 
SERVICE 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 
1710 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)538-2333 
time. We're talking the week after the accident and the 
week, I guess, after Christmas. 
A. Just running and scratchy and uncomfortable. 
Q. Were you having pain in any other parts of your body 
or was that primarily the pain that seemed to mask everything 
else? 
A. No, no, no, I got along fine. I mean — 
Q. In recovering from that type of surgery? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You still had a cast on your foot, of course? 
A. Right. 
Q. Were you taking medication at that time during that 
period, say, from the accident up until Christmas? I'm 
talking about pain medication. 
A. I'm sure I was. 
Q. Do you remember what it was? 
A. Nope. 
Q. Tylenol? 
A. Probably Tylenol 3, I'd imagine. 
Q. What about the week after Christmas? 
A. I wasn't on pain pills very long. 
Q. Say from the 25th up until the end of the year? 
A. I don't know the dates. 
Q. But in any event, you started seeing Dr. Dafler in 
Price. I'm sure the record would show when that was. Would 
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surgery? 
A. He didn't have the equipment here. 
Q. And then the records, I think, show that on April 11, 
1989, is when you had your surgery for your cornea 
transplant? 
A. That's right. 
Q. That was done in Salt Lake City? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that done in the hospital? 
A. No. 
Q. Or right at the — 
A. At a clinic. 
Q. At the clinic there, the eye clinic in Salt Lake? 
A. No, they took me to the Surgical Center. 
Q. During this period of time we're talking about 
February, March, — actually it's three months, January, 
February, March, into the middle of April, tell me what pain, 
if any, you experienced in your eye. 
A. As I said, all it was was an irritation, a 
scratching, eyes running. 
Q. Did that continue about the same through that three 
and a half month period? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever get any relief from it? 
A. Yes, Dr. Dafler kept giving me different soothing — 
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Q. After you had your corneal transplant how did your 
eye feel after that? 
A. Pretty good* 
Q. Did that immediately restore your vision? 
A. Not immediately, but it got better quickly. It just 
really was amazing at how quick it did come back. 
Q. Change night to day, so to speak? 
A. It did real well. 
Q. Had you totally lost the sight in that right eye 
before you had your corneal transplant? 
A. It wasn't black but it was shadow. 
Q. You still had normal vision in your left eye? 
A. Right. 
Q. How long did it take after your corneal transplant 
until your vision returned to what it is now? 
A* I could see pretty good the next day, but it took it 
weeks, maybe months. 
Q. It's leveled off now, has it? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
eye now? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
How is your vision now? 
Pretty good. 
Do you know what your visual acuity is in your right 
I think he said 20/30. 
What about in your left eye? 
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A. No. 
Q. They look like they're in pretty good condition. 
A. Yes, they're not too bad. I haven't been to the 
dentist for a year, but last time I went it was okay. 
Q. Do you have any problems with your eye now other 
than what you've described for me, your right eye? 
A. Other than it does get dry and I have to keep — I 
have to put medication in it three times a day and then the 
ointment at night to keep it moist; I probably always will. 
Q. Dr. Charlton has requested that you do that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the vision, you've described your vision as 
being pretty good with your glasses? 
A. Pretty good. 
Q. You can see well enough to do everything you did 
before? 
A. Pretty well. 
Q. You sew? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you do needlepoint? 
A. I do handwork, yes. 
Q. Is it needlepoint? 
A. No, I don't do needlepoint. Embroidery work and 
craftwork. 
Q. Do you have any other hobbies other than that? 
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you're really seeing now would be Dr. Charlton? 
A. I had a complete — that was October, so that was 
last year. I had a complete checkup from Dr. Etzel, annual 
thing — well, it should be annual, it usually goes a couple 
of years. But I had one in October. 
Q. That would have been last year? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you pass that with flying colors? 
A. I passed it fine. 
Q. Your general health is still good? 
A. Very good. I'd say this accident has slowed me do*m 
considerably. 
Q. Tell me how it has slowed you down. 
A. Well, I don't hop out of bed and move the furniture 
around and wash the windows and everything like I used to. 
It takes me until about noon, then I move something. It has. 
slowed me down. 
Q. Have you had to cut out any activities that you had 
before? 
A. I'm not as much fun as I was before. 
Q. I don't know, you must have been pretty good before. 
You're pretty good now. You're still taking a trip with your 
husband? 
A. You bet. 
Q. And you're walking, you said, on a regular basis; 
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right? 
A. Right. 
Q. You're still active in your church? 
A. Very. 
Q. You still, I guess, are involved with your children 
and grandchildren? 
A. Every chance we get. 
Q. Extens ively? 
A. You bet, very. 
Q. It sounds to me like the problem you're dealing with 
now, you've mentioned the numbness and slobbering and the 
problem with your lip. Then you've mentioned these problems 
you've had with your eye from time to time of having to have 
stitches removed or corrected? 
A. There's strain, strain to the eyes and dryness. Now 
this eye doesn't close completely now because of the nerve 
that's cut there. Although they put the cheek there that 
holds it up, it still does not close completely. So it gets 
dry. So there's just a dry, irritating feeling there. 
Q. Do you have to put some — 
A. Drops. 
Q. — in that eye, too? 
A. He told me to just use artificial tears there to 
keep it moist. 
Q. And that seems to help okay? 
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Q. Can you describe how your vision is different since 
the accident? You said you were seeing 20/30 in one and 
20/30 in the other, I understand? 
A. I said I wasn't sure what it was in the left side. 
It's just that sometimes when my eye gets scratchy or watery, 
like looking at this paper it's blurry. Then if I look at it 
real close for a while I can see it. 
Q. Do you generally read the newspaper at night? 
A. Not often. 
Q. Do you take the newspaper? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Since the accident have you read any books? 
A. No# I study scriptures and that for my Relief 
Society. 
Q. Are you able to read your scriptures all right? 
A. Like I said, if I focus clearly. 
Q. What size of print are your scriptures printed? 
A. Ordinary. 
Q. You say ordinary? 
A. I don't have this big print. 
Q. It isn't an enlarged print? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you able to read your Relief Society manual all 
right? 
A. Like I said, again, when I focus it just right. 
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ADDENDUM 5 
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as 
the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests 
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said 
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action 
upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless 
the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally 
or otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions are to 
be given in writing, all objections thereto must be made before 
the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections may 
be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction 
unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an 
instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and 
in the interests of justice, may review the giving of or failure 
to give an instruction. Opportunity shall be given to make 
objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of the 
jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made 
after the court has instructed the jury. The court shall not 
comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court states any 
of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
ADDENDUM 6 
RULE 103(a) and (d) Rulings on Evidence 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless 
a substantial right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike 
appear of record, stating the specific ground of objection, 
if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made 
known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context 
within which questions were asked. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes 
taking notice of plan errors affecting substantial rights 
although they were not brought to the attention of the court. 
ADDENDUM 7 
RULE 104 (a) Preliminary Questions 
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary 
questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a 
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of 
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the 
provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its determination it is 
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to 
privileges. 
ADDENDUM 8 
RULE 702 Testimony by experts 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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